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Master‟s Thesis 
Annastiina Hintsa 
INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES IN PROVISION OF CREDIT TO WOMEN IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES – EVIDENCE FROM UGANDA 
The importance of access to credit in terms of development is well recognized, as is the 
overrepresentation of women in the poorest segments of the third world societies. The purpose of 
this thesis is to study the institutional differences in provision of credit to women in developing 
countries. 
The financial sector in developing countries can be divided into formal, semiformal and informal 
financial institutions. For a number of reasons culminated in information asymmetries, women are 
assumed to be more excluded from formal financial services than men. On the other hand, they are 
also considered an important force driving the economic and social development in their countries. 
This is why many semiformal, mainly microfinance institutions (MFI), have decided to focus on 
female clients - alongside reasons related to MFI efficiency. Furthermore, while targeted by semi-
formal institutions, it is also believed women have a higher tendency to participate in communal 
forms of informal finance. Based on these notions, it could be thus assumed that there are 
significant institutional differences in women‟s access to credit in developing countries.  
However, recent studies show the situation in a different light. Not all agree poor women are more 
excluded from financial services than men, and many have questioned the developmental as well as 
efficiency based arguments of semi-formal institutions‟ gender agenda. In fact, the researchers 
today already talk of a “second generation” of microfinance institutions, who regard focusing on 
female clients as both inefficient and ineffective. Meanwhile, many formal financial institutions 
have become more aware of the unbanked population, and informal finance has been suggested as a 
viable alternative to traditional provision of financial services. The institutional differences begin to 
blur. 
In this thesis I try to answer the question to what extent there are differences in the supply of credit 
to women by formal, semiformal and informal financial institutions, and why these differences may 
exist. I base my research on a literature review of the fundamental theories of credit market 
functioning and recent research in the field. In addition, I will perform an empirical analysis of a 
case country, Uganda.  
While the literature review suggests financial institutions in developing countries differ in their 
provision of credit to women, the results of the empirical study conducted for this thesis indicated 
no significant difference in female access to formal or informal finance. They did however show a 
pro-female bias in the semiformal financial institutions‟ provision of credit, and also provided 
evidence for institutional differences in credit provision unrelated to the gender variable. The 
findings could be thus interpreted as a confirmation of gender agenda of the MFI as well as the 
often-cited challenges in measuring access to financial services. Many consider defining financial 
access per se as problematic. Nevertheless, this should be not seen as to undermine the importance 
of the field of female financial access in terms of social and economic development.  
Key words: financial institutions, information asymmetries in credit markets, female access to 
finance  
08 Fall 
2 
 
Contents 
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 5 
1.1 Background and motivation ....................................................................................................... 5 
1.2 Research question and methodology .......................................................................................... 7 
1.3 Structure of the thesis ................................................................................................................. 7 
1.4 Central definitions ...................................................................................................................... 8 
1.5 Main findings ............................................................................................................................. 9 
2. Role of financial access and women in developing countries ......................................................... 9 
2.1 Financial access in developing countries ................................................................................... 9 
2.2 Information asymmetries and credit market functioning ......................................................... 11 
2.2.1 Adverse selection .............................................................................................................. 12 
2.2.2 Ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard ..................................................................................... 13 
2.2.3 Credit markets in developing countries ............................................................................ 13 
2.3 Informal economic activity and role of women in developing countries ................................ 14 
3. Financial institutions in developing countries ............................................................................... 15 
3.1 Formal financial institutions .................................................................................................... 15 
3.2 Semiformal financial institutions ............................................................................................. 17 
3.2.1 Group lending ................................................................................................................... 18 
3.2.2 Dynamic Incentives........................................................................................................... 22 
3.3 Informal financial institutions .................................................................................................. 23 
3.3.1 Rotating Savings and Credit Associations ........................................................................ 23 
4. Female access to finance in developing countries ......................................................................... 25 
4.1 Constrained access to formal financial institutions .................................................................. 25 
4.1.2 Economic, social and cultural reasons .............................................................................. 25 
4.1.3 Household decision-making processes ............................................................................. 27 
4.2 Semiformal institutions‟ focus on female borrowers ............................................................... 28 
4.2.1 Social and developmental reasons .................................................................................... 28 
4.2.2 Microfinance institution efficiency ................................................................................... 30 
4.2.3 Criticism of the gender bias in microfinance .................................................................... 31 
3 
 
4.3 Female tendency to communal informal finance ..................................................................... 33 
5. Basis for the empirical analysis ..................................................................................................... 34 
5.1 Introduction to Uganda ............................................................................................................ 34 
5.1.1 Economic and political situation ....................................................................................... 34 
5.1.2 Financial system in Uganda .............................................................................................. 36 
5.1.3 Financial access of women in Uganda .............................................................................. 37 
5.2 Data description ....................................................................................................................... 38 
5.3 Hypotheses setting ................................................................................................................... 39 
6. Empirical model ............................................................................................................................. 39 
6.1 Variable definitions .................................................................................................................. 39 
6.1.1 Dependent variable ........................................................................................................... 39 
6.1.2 Explanatory and control variables..................................................................................... 40 
6.1.3 Summary of variable correlations ..................................................................................... 44 
6.2 Model specification .................................................................................................................. 45 
7. Empirical results ............................................................................................................................ 47 
7.1 Female access to credit ............................................................................................................ 47 
7.2 Control variables ...................................................................................................................... 48 
8. Summary and conclusions ............................................................................................................. 49 
References .......................................................................................................................................... 52 
Appendices ......................................................................................................................................... 61 
Appendix 1a: Adverse selection, a mathematical example ............................................................ 61 
Appendix 1b: Ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard, mathematical examples ................................... 62 
Appendix 2a: Assortative matching, a mathematical example ...................................................... 64 
Appendix 2b: Peer monitoring, mathematical examples ............................................................... 64 
Appendix 2c: Dynamic incentives, a mathematical example ........................................................ 65 
Appendix 3: Functioning of ROSCAs, a mathematical example .................................................. 67 
Appendix 4: Variable definitions ................................................................................................... 69 
Appendix 5: Summary of correlations ........................................................................................... 70 
Appendix 6: Results of the multinomial logit regression .............................................................. 71 
4 
 
List of figures 
 
Figure 1 Financial institution outreach .............................................................................................. 10 
Figure 2 Value of bank deposits ........................................................................................................ 11 
Figure 3 Gross domestic product per capita, current prices ............................................................... 35 
Figure 4: Adverse selection example a) ............................................................................................. 61 
Figure 5: Adverse selection example b) ........................................................................................... 612 
 
List of tables 
Table 1 Gender parity in primary education ...................................................................................... 26 
Table 2 Categorization of the financial institutions ........................................................................... 40 
Table 3 Categorization of employment variables .............................................................................. 43 
Table 4 Composition of the wealth indicator ..................................................................................... 44 
 
5 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
In the past years, the discussion around developmental finance has heated up in an intense way. 
Lack of inclusive financial systems is widely considered a key element underlying persistent 
income inequality, instability, and slower growth (The World Bank, 2008). On the other hand, the 
role of developing countries in the global economic scene has attracted increasing attention and 
media coverage following the turmoil of the financial crisis in 2008. As the Western countries 
struggle to regain their balance, the world turns its heads to the emerging and developing 
economies. In fact, in the past five years, the developing countries have accounted for over 70% of 
global economic growth. Yet much of the potential in these countries remains unexploited, as a 
significant part of their population is left without financial access. (CGAP, 2009)  
An important dimension of financial access is the access to credit. Although financial services 
include more than just credit, provision of credit has dominated the related debate and research for 
decades. Today the discussion has extended to cover fields such as savings and insurance, but the 
importance of credit ought not to be underestimated. Without inclusive financial systems, poor 
individuals will have to rely on their own resources for investments in education and entrepreneurial 
activities. According to the World Bank review on financial access in 2008, the developing 
countries have only a quarter of the credit per person compared to the developed countries. This not 
only prevents the increase in individual wellbeing, but also hinders aggregate economic growth. 
While access to finance is seen as crucial to development, the financial access of women is seen as 
especially important. The reasons behind this stem from the overrepresentation of women in the 
poorest segments of the society, their alleged exclusion from traditional sources of financing, and 
finally, their contribution to the overall social and economic development as compared to men. 
While more credit constrained than men, the empowerment of women has been shown to yield 
greater economic and social impacts (eg. Khandker, 2005; The World Bank 2008). It is thus natural, 
that their role has been highlighted in the discussion concerning developmental finance. 
The financial sector in developing countries can be roughly divided into formal, semi-formal and 
informal financial institutions, which differ both in their ability and willingness to provide credit to 
the poor, as well as in their provision of credit to women in particular. The reasons behind this go 
back to the theory of rationing in credit markets by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and to the traditional 
role women play in third world countries. Due to difficulties culminated in information asymmetries 
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and the lack of collateral, the formal financial sector, consisting mainly of traditional banks, has 
been largely unwilling or unable to provide credit services to the majority of the population in 
developing countries. Further, because of their subordinate economic and social status, women are 
often assumed to be more credit constrained than men (eg. Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010; 
UNIFEM, 2010).  
In the presence of credit rationing in formal financial markets, the poor will turn to informal sources 
for funding. Although proposed as an alternative to formal financial systems (Allen, Qian and Qian, 
2005 and 2008), informal financial institutions are referred to only as a second-best solution. In fact, 
recent studies show they vary widely in effectiveness as well as in their outreach of female clients 
(Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, Maksimovic, 2007). As an effective solution to the functioning of 
credit markets in the developing countries, microfinance institutions (MFI) promise to provide 
credit to the poor by using techniques involving joint liability group lending and dynamic incentives 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). While the success-story of microfinance institutions has been 
questioned lately, it is widely acknowledged that they have managed to create a semi-formal 
financial sector, solving many of the problems faced by formal and informal financial institutions. 
Moreover, the microfinance movement promises to reduce gender inequality and empower poor 
women around the world (eg. Karlan and Zinman, 2010, Bhattacharya et al, 2008, and Khandker, 
2005). In fact, for many, the focus on women constitutes the core of microfinance. This is also 
related to the exceptionally high repayment rates of female clients. The rationale behind MFI 
targeting of women can be thus roughly divided into social and developmental, as well as 
profitability related goals.   
Although the distinction and the differences in the provision of credit to women by different 
financial institutions might seem rather clear-cut at first sight, recent research shows the situation in 
a different light. The importance of female financial access remains acknowledged, but it is noted 
that measuring both financial access, and its impacts, are extremely complicated (The World Bank, 
2008). This has cast significant doubt on the microfinance institution gender bias. In fact, the 
researchers today already talk of a “second generation” of microfinance institutions, who regard 
focusing on female clients as both inefficient and ineffective (Karlan and Zinman, 2009). 
Meanwhile the traditional banking sector has begun to identify the potential in the unbanked 
population, and women in particular. The objectives, means and final implementation of different 
financial institutions are thus diversified, and the institutional boundaries in female access to 
finance blurred.  
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1.2 Research question and methodology 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the institutional differences in provision of credit to women in 
developing countries. The importance of access to credit in terms of development is well 
recognized, as is the overrepresentation of women in the poorest segments of developing societies. 
However, as stated before, the current research has questioned the rationale behind the semi-formal 
institution female focus: not all agree the poor women are more excluded from financial services 
than men and not every microfinance institution will deliberately target women. In this thesis I will 
try to answer the question to what extent there are differences in the supply of credit to women by 
formal, semiformal and informal financial institutions and why these differences may exist.  
I will base my research on a literature review of the fundamental theories of credit market 
functioning and on the recent research in the field. In addition, I will perform an analysis on 
empirical evidence from a case country, Uganda.   
1.3 Structure of the thesis  
The first part of the thesis is based on a literature review of the theories and current research around 
the subject. I will begin setting the study in context, discussing the importance of financial access, 
functioning of credit markets, and the role of informal economic activity and women in developing 
countries. I will then proceed to consider the different financial institutions, introducing the formal, 
semiformal and informal financial institutions and the mechanisms behind their functioning. 
Finally, I will provide a more detailed analysis of the institutions‟ provision of credit to women in 
particular, in chapter four. 
The second part of the thesis consists of an empirical analysis on women‟s access to credit markets 
in Uganda. The data for the study was provided by FinScope Uganda, and was collected in 
collaboration with the National Bureau of Statistics Uganda during the year 2009. In chapter five, I 
will give a short introduction to the economic and social conditions in Uganda, its financial 
markets, and the status of women. I will also give a short description of the data and some details 
about the collection. I will then describe the dependent, explanatory and control variables, and 
introduce the multinomial logit model used in the study. In chapter seven, I will present and analyze 
the results of the empirical research, and finally, in chapter eight, I will draw conclusions on the 
whole study, offering room for general discussion and further remarks.  
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1.4 Central definitions 
Formal financial institutions. In her book “Access for All: Building Inclusive Financial Systems” 
Brigit Helms (2006) describes formal financial institutions as institutions, which are both regulated 
and supervised by a central bank or equivalent regulatory body. They offer a wide range of financial 
services and control a branch network, which can extend across the country and internationally. In 
addition to commercial banks, these include state banks, agricultural development banks, savings 
banks, rural banks and also some non-bank financial institutions. In the case of Uganda, the formal 
financial sector includes commercial banks, credit institutions and microfinance deposit-taking 
institutions, which are all regulated and supervised by the Bank of Uganda (Heikkilä et al., 2009).  
Semiformal financial institutions. Semiformal financial institutions fall in the middle-ground of 
formal and informal institutions in terms of organizational structure and governance as well as 
oversight and supervision by the government. Regulated, but not supervised, they include for 
example member-owned organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and nonbank 
financial institutions. (Helms, 2006) The semiformal financial institutions in Uganda consist of 
NGOs, savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) and credit-only microfinance institutions (MFI), 
which are allowed to make loans, but not to collect deposits for intermediation. These institutions 
are licensed and registered under an Act of Parliament, but are not supervised by the Bank of 
Uganda. (Heikkilä et al., 2009)  
Informal financial institutions. Helms (2006) defines the informal financial sector as the mirror 
image of formal institutions – informal institutions are thus not registered nor supervised by any 
regulatory body. Definitions of informal financial institutions vary, but at large, they include all 
financial transactions taking place in the economy beyond regulation, such as those made by 
moneylenders, pawnbrokers, savings collectors, money-guards and input supply shops, among 
others. Based on the number of participants and nature of the transaction, informal financial 
institutions can be roughly divided into individual transactions, such as moneylenders, and 
communal forms, referring to informal groups (Roodman, 2010).  Some of the most well-known 
and widely spread communal informal financial institutions include rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAs) as well as accumulating savings and credit associations (ASCAs), which 
also form most of the informal financial institutions in Uganda. Other examples of informal 
institutions in Uganda include savings clubs and burial societies. (Heikkilä et al., 2009) In this 
study, I will limit the notion of informal financial institutions to their communal forms, that is, 
voluntary, regularly meeting groups of members, who engage in financial activities.  
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1.6 Main findings 
Based on the literature review, it was assumed women were more excluded from formal provision 
of credit than men, while semiformal financial institutions explicitly targeted them. Women were 
also assumed to have a higher tendency to form informal groups for financial purposes.  
The empirical findings of this thesis supported the hypothesis that microfinance institutions do in 
fact favor women in their provision of credit. Being a female increased the probability of currently 
holding a loan from a semi-formal institution 3.6-fold compared to the initially calculated baseline 
probability. However, the empirical analysis did not show a significant difference in female 
borrower‟s access to formal sources of credit in Uganda. While contrarian to the theories of female 
exclusion from formal credit markets, it is recognized that the subject remains much debated in 
current literature. When it comes to the informal credit markets, the difference due to gender was 
also found insignificant. Reasons to this may be traced to the complexity of modeling access to 
credit in developing countries and the low rates of institutional borrowing in Uganda per se. The 
empirical analysis also provided some evidence for institutional differences in lending unrelated to 
the gender variable.  
2. Role of financial access and women in developing countries 
2.1 Financial access in developing countries  
The modern development theory sees financial development, growth and inequality as closely 
intervened. Financial access is said to enhance growth, reduce poverty, and decrease inequality. 
(The World Bank, 2008) The reasoning behind this is based on some fundamental economic 
theories. Meanwhile, measuring financial access remains a challenge.  
By the neo-classical growth model, capital increases the returns to labor (Solow, 1956), and access 
to capital is thus argued to enhance growth. However, it is not immediately obvious that broader 
financial services would reduce inequality. In fact, one could argue that the more successful a 
micro-entrepreneur in a poor country becomes, the wider the income gap between him and his 
neighbor becomes. Kuznets (1955) for example states that rapid economic growth requires wealth 
concentration, basing his argument on the fact that the rich people‟s marginal propensity to save is 
higher than the poor‟s. He thus argues there is a trade-off between justice and growth, which only 
disappears as the benefits of growth have spread throughout the economy. This would mean the 
expansion of financial access would at first increase income inequality, not decrease it.  
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Yet evidence from developing countries is highly contradictory to this hypothesis: high levels of 
inequality are related to hindered growth, while low levels of inequality have accelerated economic 
development. At the same time, empirical evidence suggests there is a significant positive 
relationship between financial depth and growth. (The World Bank, 2008) One of the key 
mechanisms is based on the fact that expanding the scope of financial systems eases the financial 
constraints related to firms. Beck et al. (2007) find that increased financial depth is in fact the most 
beneficial to the ones with the lowest initial wealth, and is thus proven to reduce income 
inequalities instead of creating them. 
It is commonly acknowledged that there exists a wide gap between the level of financial depth in 
developed and developing countries. This conclusion is based on several indicators. According to 
World Bank and Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) estimates in 2009, developing 
countries have only a quarter of the loans per person compared to the developed countries, and a 
significantly narrower outreach in terms of physical presence. The outreach is especially limited in 
rural areas due to the combination of poor levels of infrastructure and low population density. In 
fact, bringing banking services to the rural population is identified as one of the biggest challenges 
in the quest for broader financial inclusion. (CGAP, 2009)  
 
Figure 1 Financial institution outreach 
In addition to the physical outreach and number of loans, the number of deposit accounts and value 
of loans can be used to measure financial access. These are shown to differ according to the country 
specific level of development. The World Bank and CGAP (2009) estimates indicate that there are 
as many bank deposit accounts as there are people in the world. However, the accounts are highly 
concentrated in the developed countries, while developing countries hold only a third of deposits 
per person in comparison: an average adult in the developed world has 1.77 bank deposit accounts, 
while the number of bank deposits per adult in the developing world is only 0.52. Furthermore, in 
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the developing countries the value of bank deposits represents a greater percentage share of the 
GDP, while the value of an average deposit per person is only a third of the developed world 
average, indicating both lower national income and fewer deposits. (CGAP, 2009)  
 
Figure 2 Value of bank deposits 
While relatively good indicators exist, one should note that measuring financial access is not as 
straightforward as it may seem. This is due a general lack of data on the use of financial services as 
well as to the overall complexity of the matter (The World Bank, 2008; CGAP, 2009). For example, 
data on the number and value of loans was only available in a third of the 139 countries 
participating in the World Bank and CGAP survey on Financial Access (CGAP, 2009). On the other 
hand, distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary exclusion is complicated and many times 
impossible. For some customers given financial products might not be attractive due to ethical or 
religious reasons, and the non-usage is then not related to limited financial access. (The World 
Bank, 2008) In the case of women this argument takes a new level of complexity, as it is hard to 
differentiate between financial exclusion related to personal and imposed motives.  
In this study the difficulties related to measuring financial access are taken into account by limiting 
the empirical sample to individuals, who have expressed demand for credit through current 
institutional or non-institutional borrowing as it may be. However, even this is unlikely to entirely 
account for involuntary exclusion from financial services, which is acknowledged as a general 
weakness of the theoretical models behind measuring female financial access.  In the next section, I 
will discuss the theory behind credit market functioning developing countries in more detail.  
2.2 Information asymmetries and credit market functioning  
In order to set a theoretical framework for the study, I will now look at the classic model of credit 
markets functioning by Nobel Prize winners Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). What Stiglitz and Weiss 
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(1981) present in their seminal paper “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information” is 
that problems caused by information asymmetries may lead to situations in which the demand for 
credit exceeds the supply. The following section covers the fundamentals of the model by Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) and relates them to contributions by subsequent authors. A mathematical 
elaboration of the theoretical framework is provided in Appendices 1a  and 1b. It is hereby notified, 
that in order to enhance coherence and continuity, all mathematical examples to be demonstrated in 
the Appendices are derived from those by Armendáriz and Morduch (2010). Further, in all 
examples, limited liability is assumed, and only the borrower‟s inherent risk, not risks common to 
all, is considered. 
Asymmetric information was discussed already by George Akerloff in his seminal paper “The 
Market for Lemons” in 1970. Perloff (2009) defines asymmetric information as a “situation in 
which one party to a transaction knows a material fact that the other party does not”. Varian (1999) 
notes that asymmetric information may cause significant problems regarding the efficient 
functioning of any market, but that the problems are accentuated in credit markets, in which the 
presence of information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders can significantly alter the 
optimal financial contract.  
Banks making loans are interested in the interest rate they receive on a loan, as well as the riskiness 
of the loan. What Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue is that the interest a bank charges can itself alter 
the riskiness of the pool of loans. This may happen either through attracting high-risk borrowers or 
by affecting the actions and incentives of the borrower. The problems caused by information 
asymmetries can be thus divided into two distinct phenomena: adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Further on, moral hazard can be defined for ex-ante and ex-post situations.   
2.2.1 Adverse selection 
Adverse selection refers to a situation in which one side of the market lacks information about the 
other party. It is also known as the “hidden information” problem. (Varian, 1999)  
In credit markets adverse selection causes a situation in which the lending institution lacks 
information to separate risky and safe borrowers, and is thus forced to charge an average interest 
rate from both types (Bhattacharya et al., 2008). The high interest rate drives away safe borrowers, 
decreases the demand, and forces the bank to charge an even higher interest rate in order to cover 
costs. A high interest rate is in turn associated with a more risky pool of borrowers, who are willing 
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to take bigger risks to gain higher return, but are also more likely to fail to repay their debt, 
therefore decreasing the bank‟s expected return.  
In practice this means the bank will have to reject loans to borrowers, who are observationally 
identical to those who receive loans. This results in denied access, and credit rationing in 
equilibrium. (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) For a mathematical example of adverse selection, please see 
Appendix 1a.  
2.2.2 Ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard 
While adverse selection can be described as the “hidden information” problem, Varian (1999) 
defines moral hazard as a “hidden action” problem. By general definition, moral hazard refers to 
opportunism characterized by an informed person taking advantage of a less-informed person 
through unobserved action (Perloff, 2009).  In credit markets moral hazard occurs when the lender 
is unable to observe the effort made and action taken by the borrower, or alternatively, the 
realization of the project returns (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010).  Thus, moral hazard can be 
defined for ex-ante and ex-post situations respectively. 
Ex-ante moral hazard relates to the idea that the lender cannot observe the borrowers actions after 
the loan has been granted, but before the returns have been realized. It is thus equivalent to the 
probability of a good realization of returns (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). The probability could 
be consequently seen as the effort the borrower extends to make sure the project succeed.   
Ex-post moral hazard on the other hand, refers to the possibility of the borrower to abscond with the 
money after the returns have been realized. It is also known as the enforcement problem 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). In addition to taking away with the money, the borrowers – 
protected by limited liability – may have the incentive to pretend their returns were lower, i.e. 
strategically default (Bhattacharya et al, 2008). For a mathematical elaboration on the impacts of 
ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard, please see Appendix 1b. 
2.2.3 Credit markets in developing countries 
At this point, we can note why the impact of information asymmetries is accentuated in developing 
countries. Normally, a bank would compensate for the inherent risks related to the borrower caused 
by adverse selection and moral hazard by requesting a collateral to be seized upon default. In 
developing countries a significant part of the population is poor and by definition lacks assets 
valuable enough to act as collateral. The problems are further enhanced by issues such as backward 
infrastructure, costliness of screening loan applicants and monitoring borrowers, difficulties in 
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writing and enforcing contracts due to imperfections in the judicial system, and low levels of 
literacy (Besley, 1995).  
De Soto (2000) argues that through for example the improvement of the judicial system and 
property rights, the situation of credit provision to the poor could be alleviated. Given that an asset 
valuable enough for collateral existed, in many cases social or legal reasons prevent the lending 
institution from seizing it in case of default. The bank might for example run into large-scale 
community opposition upon seizing the house of a poor family unable to pay back their loan. This 
is why limited liability is assumed when modeling credit services to the poor – that is, it is assumed 
that the poor cannot pay back more than their current income (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010).  
2.3 Informal economic activity and role of women in developing countries 
In order to be able to understand the institutional differences in provision of credit to women in the 
third world, one must set the research question into a wider context. Limited financial access is 
closely related to informal economic activity, which has an important role in many developing 
countries. Interestingly, women play a significant part in this sector, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
Constrained access to formal financial services is particularly related to informal economic activity, 
the importance of which ought not to be underestimated in developing economies. Blackden and 
Sudharshan (2003) estimate the share of the informal sector in non-agricultural GDP is 41% in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), 29% in Latin America and 41% Asia. Yet the informal sector has been 
largely overlooked, neglected and even suppressed. Despite the neglect, it has grown significantly 
and contributed to the overall growth of national products in developing economies, including many 
SSA countries. (Blackden and Sudharshan, 2003) It is then reasonable to ask, what could be the 
impact of this sector, given that it had the capital to realize its potential. Excluding South Africa, the 
share of informal employment in non-agricultural employment in SSA is 78%, and including 
agricultural production, up to 83%. Self-employment on the other hand, represents 70% of all 
informal employment and 53% of non-agricultural production (ILO, 2002). This means a relatively 
high percentage of entrepreneurship and significant potential for microfinance institutions.  
Furthermore, women represent a major part in the informal workforce. In sub-Saharan Africa the 
economic role of women is widely recognized. In 2000, the World Bank realized a major survey 
under the title “Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?”. The main argument was that in Africa there 
lies an enormous potential of hidden growth reserves, which are culminated in women. A 
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distinguishing characteristic of African economies compared to the rest of the developing world is 
that women and men both play substantial economic roles – in fact, much of African economic 
activity is in the hands of its women, even though the workforce by gender shows considerable 
sectoral variation. Elson and Evers (1997) call this “gender intensity of production”. Building on the 
Elson and Evers (1997) methodology Blackden and Sudharshan (2003) calculate that in SSA, men 
contribute to approximately two thirds, and women to one third of economic activity, but they also 
note that their calculations are likely to underestimate the contribution of women, due to their high 
involvement in invisible economic activity not captured by the System of National Accounts 
(SNA). In fact, women make up for approximately 60% of the informal labor force in SSA, and it is 
estimated that 66% of female activities in developing countries are not captured by the SNA, 
compared with only 24% of male activities. Moreover, 84% of non-agricultural female workers are 
informally employed, compared to 63% of men. (ILO, 2002; Blackden and Sudharshan, 2003) All 
this can be said to make women an important part of the hidden growth reserve in Africa, 
highlighting their need for financial access.  
Finally, when discussing the role of women, it must be pointed out that while women play 
significant economic roles in many developing countries, according to UNIFEM (2010) they also 
bear a “disproportionate burden of the world‟s poverty”.  In many third world countries women face 
more poverty and hunger because of their systematic discrimination in education, health care, 
employment and control of assets. According to some estimates, women represent up to 70% of the 
world‟s poor (UNIFEM, 2010). They are often paid less than men for their work and face persistent 
discrimination when they apply for credit for business or self-employment. Women are also 
concentrated in insecure, unsafe and low-wage professions. Eight out of ten women workers are 
considered to be in vulnerable employment in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. (UNIFEM, 
2010) Due to the impacts of the recent economic crisis, their situation is even worse. The 
International Labor Organization (ILO, 2009) estimates that the financial crisis in 2008 led to up to 
22 million women to lose their jobs in 2009. The need to improve the female status in developing 
countries can be considered urgent.  
3. Financial institutions in developing countries  
3.1 Formal financial institutions 
By definition, formal financial institutions consist mainly of traditional banks acting under the 
supervision and regulation of a central bank or an equivalent regulatory agency. They often control 
16 
 
a network of branches and offer a wide range of financial services. In third world countries 
however, they tend to suffer from technological backwardness and unstable oligopolistic 
competitive situations. (Bhattacharya et al., 1997) In fact, when it comes to the developing 
countries, the formal financial sector is often characteristically undeveloped and only serves a 
fraction of the population.  
As discussed in the context of credit market functioning in section 2.2, the problems faced by the 
formal financial institutions are to a great extent due to the information asymmetries in credit 
markets and poor people‟s lack of collateral. However, the deficiencies in the formal sector‟s 
outreach involve more. In their survey of 209 banks from 62 developing countries Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Martinez (2008) find various barriers to outreach, including minimum account and loan 
balances, loan fees, and required documents. They also discover strong associations between 
barriers to outreach and measures of restrictions on bank activities, bank disclosure practices and 
media freedom, as well as the development of physical infrastructure. Furthermore, they find that 
government-owned banks tend to impose more barriers on financial services, while the barriers are 
lower in the presence of international competition and in the case of larger banks.  
The undeveloped financial markets in developing countries have a tendency to attract foreign 
entrants, as the uncompetitive formal banking sector and more limited regulation are often seen as 
incentives for foreign financial institutions to enter the market. (Bhattacharya et al., 1997) While 
international competition can be seen as to lower barriers to outreach (Beck et al., 2008), there also 
exist several potential risks related to it, some perhaps more founded than others. One of the most 
feared outcomes is that allowing entrance of foreign banks to the developing financial markets may 
reduce the customer base of local banks, as the clientele may perceive the large, foreign financial 
institutions as more reliable than smaller, domestic counterparts. This infant industry argument for 
protecting developing domestic financial markets is used by for example Stiglitz (1993, cited in 
Bhattacharya, 1994): “there is sufficient learning-by-doing… in an industry as complex as the 
financial sector”, and has been adopted by politicians in many developing countries. Other common 
fears include the fear of capital flight and unhealthy competition (Bhattacharya, 1994).  
As it is for today, the potential gains from global financial integration seem to have won ground 
over the fears, and the tide is towards the integration of developing economies into the world 
financial system. Schmukler (2004) points out however, that in order for successful integration to 
take place, the economic fundamentals need to be and remain strong. In many third world countries, 
this is not the case, and the undeveloped character of the formal financial sector may have serious 
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consequences in terms of overall economic development. Knight (1998) argues that an imperfectly 
competitive banking system may respond to adverse shocks in ways that worsen their impact, and 
that in the era of financial globalization this could induce negative macroeconomic feedback. Thus, 
in order to benefit from the growth potential in developing and transition economies, the problems 
related to financial system soundness must first be addressed (Knight, 1998). This relates to the 
view of financial access as a perquisite for development, and also gives the developed economies a 
stake at the design of inclusive financial systems in the third world. 
3.2 Semiformal financial institutions  
By the general definition, semiformal financial institutions are registered and thus subject to the 
regulations concerning financial institutions, while they still remain largely unsupervised by the 
main financial regulator (Helms, 2006). At the core of semiformal finance, microfinance institutions 
claim to effectively solve the problems related to information asymmetries in credit markets relying 
on the innovations of group lending and dynamic incentives.  
The microfinance movement has its roots further than most would imagine. The Irish Loan Fund 
system in the 1700‟s is widely known as one of the first formal microfinance institutions, but 
savings clubs and credit groups operating by various names around the world have provided 
financial services for centuries (Helms, 2006). In the 1800‟s, various types of larger and more 
formal savings and credit institutions were born in Europe. The emerging institutions were known 
as People's Banks, Credit Unions, and Savings and Credit Co-operatives, and were primarily 
organized among the poorest segments of urban and rural societies. Adaptations of these models 
began to appear in the Latin America in the 1900‟s. Microcredit institutions, referring to 
experimental programs allowing groups of poor women to invest in micro-businesses, were born in 
the 1970‟s. Early pioneers included the Nobel Prize winning Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, 
ACCION International from Latin America, and the Self-Employed Women‟s Association Bank in 
India. The movement spread fast, and in the early 1990‟s the term “microcredit” was substituted by 
microfinance so as to also account for savings and other financial services.  
As for today, the borders between microfinance institutions and larger financial systems are starting 
to blur, as commercial banks are entering the field, and an increasing emphasis is placed upon 
inclusive financial systems around the world. (Helms, 2006) Bringing banking services to rural 
clients has been identified as one of the biggest challenges in the quest for broader financial 
inclusion, and many believe semiformal institutions can be considered especially successful in this 
aspect. In some developing countries, the microfinance institutions have developed into dominant, 
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regulated finance providers, which hold more accounts than banks, and serve a broader range of 
customers in a wider geographic area. (CGAP, 2009) In the following sections I will discuss the 
mechanisms behind the provision of microcredit in more detail, concentrating on the functioning of 
group lending and dynamic incentives.  
3.2.1 Group lending  
Group lending is believed to be one of the most significant innovations in developmental economics 
(Guttman, 2006). Armedáriz and Morduch (2010) define group lending as “arrangements by 
individuals without collateral who get together and form groups with the aim of obtaining loans 
from a lender.” Todaro (2000) remarks that the idea behind group lending schemes is in fact very 
simple: the group allocates the funds to its members, who are responsible of repaying to the group, 
while the group itself guarantees the loan to the outside lender. By joining together a group of small 
borrowers can reduce the costs of lending and gain access to credit capital.  
In a detailed study, Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) describe the basic functioning of perhaps the most 
famous example of a group lending institution, the Nobel Peace Prize winning Grameen Bank of 
Bangladesh:  
“The Grameen Bank borrowers organize themselves into groups of five people.  Due to 
social norms, men and women are in different groups, and all members must be from the 
same village. After the group is formed, they receive training from a Bank employee, and 
begin weekly meetings. In these meetings, the members are required to make small savings 
deposits. Several weeks after later, the first two members receive a small loan. If these initial 
borrowers make their required weekly payments and if the group binds to the rules of 
Grameen Bank, two next members receive loans, and finally the last one. If one of the group 
members defaults, the group is responsible of paying back the loan. If the loan is not paid 
back, all members of the group are ineligible for Grameen Bank credit in the future. In 
addition, the loan sizes will increase progressively over the years only given that the group 
fulfills its duties.” 
There are several factors, which make this model successful and thus widely replicated around the 
world. The weekly meetings offer convenience to the villagers as the bank comes to them, and 
reduce the transaction costs of the bank by dealing with multiple transactions at once. The self-
selection of the groups helps to overcome the problem of adverse selection, and the social pressure, 
public payments, and peer monitoring due to the joint liability contract, mitigate moral hazard. The 
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fact that all members come from the same village emphasizes this. Dynamic incentives – created by 
the non-refinancing threat and loss of future, increasing credit – have also a major impact on the 
success of the model. Some say they may be even enough on their own (Guttman, 2008).  
While successful, group lending only represents one form of microfinance today. Also, as the field 
is constantly evolving, various schemes exist within group lending itself. Even the Grameen Classic 
System has been modified, as Mr. Yunus himself saw the original model as “inflexible and 
consisting of a set of standardized rules where no departure from these rules was allowed” (Yunus, 
2002). Further examples of group lending schemes used around the world include the “solidarity 
group” approach of Bolivia‟s Banco Sol and the “village bank” approach used by 70 countries in 
Africa, Latin America and Asia. As their name suggests, these approaches may involve entire 
villages. (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010) While the groups differ in many ways, the basic 
mechanisms remain the same. Following, I will examine these mechanisms behind the mitigation of 
information asymmetries through group lending in more detail. Mathematical examples can be 
found in Appendices 2a – 2c.  
The mitigation of adverse selection by group lending happens through a process called assortative 
matching. The mechanism was first demonstrated by Ghatak (1999, 2000) and van Tassel (1999), 
who claim that group lending can solve the hidden information problem by taking advantage of the 
information the villagers have about each other, benefitting from the tight-knit communities in 
which the poor often live. When allowed to form their own groups, the poor will sort themselves 
into “risky” and “safe” borrowers, thus overcoming the adverse selection problem (Ghatak, 1999, 
2000; van Tassel, 1999).  According to Ghatak (1999), the borrowers‟ self-selection of groups leads 
to differential expected costs of borrowing depending on the borrower‟s type. In brief, safe 
borrowers will be willing to pay more than risky borrowers to have safe borrowers as their fellow 
group members (Guttman, 2008). In this way they reduce the probability of having to pay for a 
defaulting group member. While all borrowers face the exact same interest rates and contracts, safe 
borrowers will pay lower effective interest rates, since their expected costs, including repaying for 
defaulting group members, are lower (Battacharya et al. 2008). For a mathematical demonstration 
of assortative matching, please see Appendix 2a. 
Despite the undeniable value of the assortative matching model, the latest research also points out 
some limitations. Firstly, Guttman (2008) claims positive assortative matching does not necessarily 
hold in the presence of dynamic incentives, underlining the importance of the refinancing threat. If 
the group defaults, each member loses the opportunity to borrow in the future. Shortly to be 
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discussed, the refinancing threat plays an important role in the functioning of many semiformal 
lending schemes. Further, Banerjee et al (1994) point out that the assortative matching model does 
not account for risk aversion: if a borrower would be risk averse, he would not participate in a joint 
liability contract implying unlimited liability of the other group member‟s debts. This would 
undermine the basic assumptions of assortative matching.  
Lastly, contrarian to the previous research, Armendáriz and Gollier (2000) claim that assortative 
matching is not required at all in order for group lending to work. Although it no longer achieves 
the optimum result, group lending is found to improve efficiency even in the absence of borrower‟s 
information about each other, that is, in the absence of assortative matching. Armendáriz and 
Gollier (2000) base their assumption on the collateral effect, i.e. the fact that when the upper tail of 
the revenue distribution for risky borrowers is higher than the upper tail of the revenue distribution 
for safe borrowers, group lending reduces the extent to which risky borrowers can take advantage - 
via the equilibrium interest rate - of the safe borrowers' participation to the credit market. While an 
interesting argument, Cassar (2007) points out that the model by Armendáriz and Gollier (2000) is 
highly sensitive to assumptions about borrower returns.  
When it comes to the mitigation of moral hazard, it must be first noted that the problem in a group 
lending situation differs largely from that of an individual lending event. In short, in a group lending 
situation the individuals engage in common risk sharing, under conditions in which their privately 
taken actions affect the probability distribution of the outcome for the entire group (Abbink et al, 
2006). As demonstrated in chapter 2.2, the problems caused by moral hazard to credit provision in 
developing countries are related to the lack of collateral. The mitigation of this problem is based on 
the joint liability and strong social ties the villagers have. Cassar et al (2007) find that when jointly 
liable, the social ties generate trust that each member will contribute, and thus induce an incentive 
for all group members to repay. Thus, in the absence of physical assets, the social pressure and 
threat of social sanctions in effect act as collateral, making default more costly to the borrower 
(Battacharya et al., 2008).  
The success of the group lending scheme is largely dependent on peer monitoring. In his pioneering 
work, Stiglitz (1990) demonstrates that through peer monitoring the bank can transfer the inherent 
risk related to the borrower to the cosigner of the contract.  He also shows that the transfer of risk 
induces an increase in the borrowers‟ welfare. For mathematical examples of the mitigation of both 
ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard through peer monitoring, please see Appendix 2b.  
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An interesting point related to peer monitoring is the nature of social sanctions. In Stiglitz‟s model 
(1990), the social sanctions, which enforce the individual to maximize the group benefit, are 
costless. Given the threat of social sanctions, no members will shirk, and thus the sanctions need not 
to be executed, which justifies the assumption of their cost being zero. On the other hand, the threat 
of social sanctions adds to the incentive of taking on a safe investment in the first place. Through 
these mechanisms both ex-ante and ex-post moral hazards can be mitigated.  
In an alternative model, Wydick (2001) includes the sanctions in the form of group expulsion as a 
credible threat. In his model social sanctions are an endogenous variable that constitutes a part of 
the equilibrium strategy for the borrower. Given a sufficiently low level of peer monitoring, the 
group might exclude a member even though risky behavior did not take place. However, in a high-
information environment, this would be unlikely to be the case.  
Armendáriz (1999) points out that the resulting benefits of peer monitoring should be always 
weighed against the monitoring costs. For a correct evaluation, the benefits must be viewed as 
dependent on the correlation of risks within the group. When positively correlated, the risks 
enhance the incentive to monitor. This is often the case especially in rural areas, where investment 
returns across agriculture tend to be similar. Akin Armendáriz‟s (1999) claims, Banerjee et al 
(1994) find that peer monitoring in rural areas is in fact more efficient than in urban circumstances. 
This is also due to the costs of monitoring being higher in the city, where people tend to disappear 
their way during the day and contacts between group members may be less frequent. In addition, 
projects for which loans are made in urban areas are often not as publicly visible as for example 
agricultural investments. Finally, consistent with Armendáriz (1999) and Banerjee et al (1994), 
Gangopadhyay et al (2005) criticize the necessity of the assumption that borrowers live close to one 
another and that they have more information about each other than the lender. In many 
circumstances this is not the case, and factors such as the positive correlation of risks become more 
important. 
To conclude, while the details remain widely discussed, there seems to exist consensus about the 
basic mechanisms behind mitigation of adverse selection as well as ex-ante and ex-post moral 
hazard through group lending. However, it should be pointed out that due to circumstantial 
differences, successful institutions, such as the Grameen Bank, cannot be simply transplanted from 
one environment to another (Gangopadhyay et al., 2005). Group lending is also not the only 
alternative.  
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3.2.2 Dynamic Incentives 
As for today, many microfinance institutions also exercise individual lending schemes. Even 
without joint liability, assortative matching or peer monitoring, semiformal institutions are able to 
create incentives for borrowers to repay. This is to a large extent reliant on the invention of dynamic 
incentives, which can be divided into two distinct mechanisms: defaulting borrowers are denied 
future loans, and on the other hand, the size of the loans may be gradually increased as the borrower 
demonstrates reliability. (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010) A mathematical example of the 
functioning of dynamic incentives is provided in Appendix 2c.  
Dynamic incentives themselves are not a new concept. Aleem (1990) finds evidence of 
moneylenders relying mainly on non-refinancing threats, supported by two devices for debt 
repayment: close client relationships, and ensuring clients do not borrow from other sources. These 
make the threat of denying future credit a powerful tool. In the case of semiformal institutions, 
perhaps the most important precondition for the functioning of dynamic incentives is the credibility 
of the lending institution. This applies both for the non-refinancing threat and the gradually 
increased loan sizes. The borrowers must believe that by defaulting they are denied future loans, 
and that on the other hand, that the institution is in fact able to increase their loan sizes in the future.  
This puts high emphasis on maintaining stability. Bond and Rai (2002) for example find that default 
rates for an Ecuadorian microfinance institution rose significantly when the institution faced 
speculations about an organizational financial crisis. Also, while desirable in most economic 
contexts, competition may significantly deteriorate dynamic incentives: multiple sources of loans 
reduce the power of a single lender to impose non-refinancing threats. In the long run, this will 
impact their financial ability to increase the size of the loans. (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010) 
While increasingly popular, the role of dynamic incentives is sometimes debated. It is 
acknowledged that the mechanism relies on the fact that the borrowers are assumed to request 
external financing also in the future. As Bond and Krishnamurty (2001) point out, this may not 
always be the case. In countries in which economic planning in terms of long-term investments is 
not the norm, the fundamentals behind dynamic incentives are often undermined. As in the case of 
group lending, this emphasizes the importance of circumstantial differences when it comes to the 
provision of semiformal financial services.  
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3.3 Informal financial institutions 
Informal financial institutions constitute perhaps the oldest form of financial transactions, and are 
generally considered a mine of lessons for the semiformal financial sector (Schreiner, 2000). 
Having been around for so long, they can be found on almost every continent, by different names 
and in different forms. As stated before, the focus of this thesis is on the communal forms of 
informal finance, in which people join together for mutual support – “to lend to, save with, and 
insure each other” (Roodman, 2010). Similar to semi-formal groups, typically the members know 
one another and come from similar situations in life, and most often share geographical proximity. 
The social communities and thus the mechanisms of informal credit intermediation are then 
effectively based on mutual trust, interdependence, and peer pressure. To differentiate these self-
formed groups from the semiformal group lending, in the informal groups all members and parties 
of the transaction are clients as well as providers. (Roodman, 2010)  
Vast research (e.g. Ardener and Burman, 1995; Bouman 1995 and Graham, 1992) points out to six 
virtues of informal finance: low transaction costs, supply of savings and insurance in addition to 
loans, sensitivity to constraints faced by women, confidence in place of physical collateral, socially 
enforced contracts, and sequences of repeated transactions. As one can see, many of these are 
lessons semiformal finance draws upon.  
However, academics also conclude informal finance falls short of formal and semi-formal systems 
in various ways (Schreiner, 2000). Chirstensen (1993) summarizes informal finance weaknesses as 
follows: no deposit insurance, no large or long loans and finally, no legal systems to enforce 
contracts. With the availability of capital being entirely dependent upon the group itself, it faces 
certain limitations, while the positive correlation of risks discussed in the context of semiformal 
financing may have even more serious consequences for informal groups. The simplicity of 
informal finance thus also results in its biggest weakness, rigidity. Yet its importance in developing 
economies ought not to go unnoticed.  
3.3.1 Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
Perhaps the most universal form of communal informal finance is the Rotating Savings and Credit 
Association (ROSCA) – known as tanda in Mexico, susu in Ghana and chits in India (Smets, 2000). 
Bouman (1995) finds an exceptionally high participation rate in these associations around the 
world. This ranges from 50 to 95 percent of the adult population in the Republic of Congo, 
Cameroon, Gambia, and villages of Liberia, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Nigeria.  
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The basic ROSCA model relies on every member of the group contributing a fixed sum into a 
common pot on a regular basis. This pot is then allotted in part or whole to each participant at a 
time, until all participants have had their turn. The distribution may take place in many ways such 
as lottery, auction, seniority, negotiation or consensus. For a participant who receives the pot early 
in the cycle, the ROSCA resembles a loan – he receives a large payout and then must steadily pay 
back in. On the other hand, for those, who come last, the ROSCA is a savings account. (Armendáriz 
and Morduch, 2010; Smets, 2000) In their seminal contribution, Besley, Coate, and Loury (1993) 
argue that, on average, ROSCAs allow individuals to receive the pot, and hence make the desired 
purchase or investment, earlier than through individual savings.  
Interestingly, there also exists evidence for participation in ROSCAs based on demand for savings 
and not provision of loans. Anderson and Baland (2002) find that women favor ROSCAs since they 
help them keep the money out of the house, while Rutherford (1997) notes the most common reason 
for participating in ROSCAs among slum dwellers in Dhaka was to save. Further evidence is 
provided by Gugerty (2003), who surveys ROSCA participants in Western Kenya, finding support 
for saving commitments as a primary motive to join ROSCAs.  
Characteristic to informal finance, ROSCAs have one major advantage: simplicity. They are easy to 
understand; the cycle has a clear beginning and a distinct end. They are transparent in operations, 
and no shared funds are accumulated under a single person‟s care, which effectively mitigates 
fraud. The day the funds are collected, they are also distributed.  However, despite its beauty, the 
simple structure also results in inflexibility. As noted earlier, problems may arise when the financial 
needs and abilities of the group members are correlated, and this is the case in most ROSCA 
groups. The majority of ROSCAs are very local institutions, indicating that needs arising from the 
external environment, such as a bad harvest season, impact all group members simultaneously. 
Furthermore, while ROSCAs put the money in a community to good use, they do not offer ways to 
move resources across independent communities.  
The rigidity has given rise to new forms of informal financing, including bidding processes for 
allotment and complicated arrangements, such as burial clubs. Another well-known form of 
informal finance is the Accumulating Savings and Credit Association (ASCA), which is to a great 
extent similar to a ROSCA, but instead of distributing the pot immediately, saves it for later on. 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010) For a mathematical example of the functioning of ROSCAs, 
please see Appendix 3. 
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4. Female access to finance in developing countries 
4.1 Constrained access to formal financial institutions 
There exist several reasons to why it is commonly believed that women are more credit constrained 
than men in the third world. These reasons can be roughly divided on economic, social and cultural 
grounds, and are more broadly connected to the general status of women in the developing world; in 
their societies and in their homes. As by the latter, an important aspect related to female financial 
access deals with intra-household decision-making processes.  
4.1.2 Economic, social and cultural reasons 
According to UN estimates women represent up to 70% of the world‟s poor (UNIFEM, 2010). As 
touched upon in the context of women‟s role in developing countries in section 2.3, they lag behind 
in many key indicators of economic development, and face significantly more social, legal, and 
economic obstacles (Strauss and Beegle, 1996). UNICEF (2007) estimates women perform 66 % of 
the world‟s work and produce 50 % of the food, but earn only 10 % of the income and own just 1 % 
of the world property. These figures relate to two issues, which form basis of women‟s economic 
constraints to credit: female access to formal labor markets, and the question of land rights in 
developing countries. As we will see, these economic constraints relate the female access to credit 
directly to the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model of information asymmetries in credit markets.  
The question of land rights is closely related to women‟s lack of assets valuable enough to act as 
collateral. In many developing countries, women have been traditionally denied access to land 
ownership, often based on religious and cultural reasons. While the situation has somewhat 
improved, challenges remain. Even in countries, where the national legislation guarantees women‟s 
land rights, the good intentions have not translated into reality. One example is Madagascar, where 
women‟s right to land is guaranteed in the Constitution and the Civil Code. Yet, although 83 % of 
employed women work in agriculture, they own just 15 % of small landholdings. (UNIFEM, 2010) 
The question of land rights and the resulting lack of collateral thus remains a significant factor 
limiting the female access to credit. 
When it comes to work, women are assigned to most of the housework and family responsibilities, 
and thus lack financial compensation for their contribution. Lack of permanent income is an 
obvious obstacle for access to credit, but it has also a major impact on the women‟s position in 
intra-household bargaining: where women have no income, they have less to say (UNIFEM, 2010). 
This in turn affects the role women play in the economy as a whole. The situation can be seen as an 
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interaction between the household and market economy (Elson and Evers, 1997). This will be 
discussed in more detail in the following section dealing with household decision-making 
processes, a model relating financial access more directly to the women‟s status in the society.  
The economic issues are accompanied by 
various social and cultural factors. Illiteracy is 
especially high among rural women (Rau, 
2004) and although globally the gender parity 
in secondary school enrolment has improved 
in countries, which have taken reforms to 
abolish school fees, problems remain. What is 
particularly noteworthy in the Eastern and 
Southern Africa is the region‟s dilemma of 
demand versus availability, which creates 
significant challenges when it comes to the 
quality of education (UNICEF, 2005). 
Furthermore, while the net 
enrolment/attendance ratios have improved, 
the rates for secondary school enrolment in 
sub-Saharan Africa and South and West Asia 
remain low (UNIFEM, 2010). The illiteracy 
of the clientele requires special skills from 
employees of formal institutions, which they 
often lack (Rau, 2004).  
To go further, women‟s access to financial 
services may be more limited due to simple 
physical barriers. For example, women‟s transportation needs are often more complex than those of 
men (Barwell, 1996), which given the poor infrastructure and branch outreach, makes their access 
to financial services more limited. Finally, religious reasons might prohibit female access to 
finance. For example in Muslim countries, religious restrictions often prevent women from seeking 
credit, or only allow them to take on credit with the co-signing of their husband, father or son (Rau, 
2004).  
 
Gender Parity 
Index 
Primary Net 
Enrolment/ 
Attendance Ratio 
Botswana 1,05 81,10 
Kenya 1,02 70,20 
Lesotho 1,08 84,70 
Madagascar 1,01 69,00 
Malawi 1,00 81,50 
Mauritius 1,02 99,20 
Namibia 1,07 78,40 
Rwanda 1,03 84,30 
Seychelles 1,00 94,80 
South Africa 1,02 93,90 
Swaziland 1,01 77,00 
Tanzania 1,00 54,40 
Uganda 1,01 78,90 
Zimbabwe 1,01 80,50 
Source: UNICEF, 2005 quoted in  UNIFEM, 2010 
Table 1 Gender parity in primary education 
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4.1.2 Household decision-making processes 
Household decision-making is a theme, which captures many of the problems related to the 
financial situation of women in developing countries. One of the key insights of gender analysis has 
been that the market and household economies co-exist and are interdependent – the potential for 
supply response and the impact of economic policies are in the end mediated and determined 
through the interactions of these two economies. (Blackden and Sudharshan, 2003) In order to 
understand the mechanisms behind intra-household resource allocation, one must begin with the 
traditional neoclassical approach. 
The neoclassical approach views the household as a single unit. Becker (1981) argues that male and 
female preferences can be aggregated into a single household objective function, in which 
individual preferences are compiled with fixed weights to determine the household level of welfare. 
This welfare function is subject to several constraints, such as time use, technology and resources. 
The final welfare will be maximized by finding the optimal allocations of resources and 
investments. In the Becker model all household resources are pooled, so while the source of income 
matters, the intra-household distribution of resources is irrelevant. As it follows, the criticism of the 
model is mostly related to the absence of household dynamics. Rogers and Scholssman (1990) note 
that the unified approach by Becker does little to address the interpersonal relations through which 
the household utility function emerges. Strauss and Beegle (1996) go even further, claiming that 
Becker model treats decision-making as a mere black box.   
In order to pay more attention to the composition of the utility function, the income maximization 
or investment model builds further on the unitary approach to household decision-making. In this 
model, the common objective of the household is to dedicate resources to maximize the household 
income. As men often have a comparative advantage in labor markets, they should devote more of 
their time to working outside the house, whereas women are should respectively dedicate 
themselves to unpaid household work. As a more reliable source of future income for their aging 
parents, this would effectively mean male children were favored over females when it comes to 
investments such as education, or even nutrition.  
This conclusion is supported by vast empirical evidence and has also received significant attention 
in the recent public discussion: “why do boys go to school more often than girls, and what are the 
patterns which have led to millions of baby girls missing in China?” (The Economist, 2010) In 
terms of academic research, Strauss and Beegle (1996) are among the many who conclude that in 
intra-household resource allocation men are in fact often favored over women. Behrman (1998) 
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shows that households in rural India become more egalitarian in surplus seasons, while in the lean 
seasons they tend to allocate more resources to household members with the highest earning 
potential and the pro-male bias is more severe. Early evidence on similar patterns dates back to 
1982, when Rozenweig and Schultz found that survival probabilities of female infants were higher 
in areas of rural India where women‟s job opportunities were greater. This relates the model to 
women‟s constrained access to the labor markets, and supports the argument that parents are forced 
to invest in children with highest earning potential. Creating employment possibilities for women 
should thus constitute a top priority in international developmental agenda.  
Related to the women‟s limited access to formal labor markets and their resulting demand for self-
employment, the demand for credit among women is often estimated to be higher than among men. 
With limited access to paid work, women value self-employment more, and thus request more funds 
(Emran et al., 2007). On the other hand, as discussed previously, it has been also pointed out that 
women might assign to credit systems in non-banking institutions for saving purposes. This could 
be also related to their subordinate position in household decision making processes. Goetz and 
Gulpta (1996) find that women might commit to microcredit programs not necessarily in order to 
gain access to credit, but in order to keep the earned money away from their husbands. 
Interestingly, his is similar to findings of women participating in communal forms of informal 
finance, namely ROSCAs.  
4.2 Semiformal institutions’ focus on female borrowers 
Women make up for 70% of microfinance institution (MFI) clients, and over 83% of the borrowers 
in the poorest segments of the MFI clientele (Armendarich and Morduc, 2010). The rationale 
behind MFI targeting women can be roughly divided into a social and developmental agenda, and 
on the other hand, microfinance institution efficiency. While widely applied, there also exists 
criticism of the gender bias in semiformal financial institutions.  
4.2.1 Social and developmental reasons 
The first arguments relate to poverty reduction and gender specific developmental impacts. As 
stated before, the overrepresentation of women in the poorest segments in the society relates to both 
their disadvantaged position in the labor markets, as well as their frequent lack of access to 
collateral. This can be used as an argument supporting the female role in poverty reduction. Going 
back to the fundamentals, the Solow-Swan growth model gives diminishing returns to labor and 
capital separately, but constant returns when the two are combined (Solow, 1956). Even though the 
model is somewhat simplified for the case and unable to take into account factors such as 
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entrepreneurship or technological progress as sources of growth, the fundamental idea of higher 
returns to labor when capital is increased can be used to argue for the importance of provision of 
credit to women, who make up an important part of the labor force, but are more capital deprived.  
Furthermore, the overall developmental impacts of lending to women have been estimated to be 
larger than those of lending to men (eg. Khandker, 2005; The World Bank 2008). According to 
Blackden and Sudharshan (2003) gender inequality directly and indirectly significantly limits 
economic growth in Africa, where women are likely to invest more in household durable goods and 
the education of their children, while men tend to spend more on personal items, such as alcohol 
and tobacco. And the phenomenon is not unique to Africa. Khandker (2005) finds that while a 
100% increase in volume of borrowing by a woman would lead to a 5% increase in the household 
nonfood expenditure and a 1% increase in the household food consumption, the equivalent numbers 
for men were just 2% for nonfood expenditure and a negligible change in food consumption. The 
evidence also shows falling fertility and illiteracy rates in Bolivia and Bangladesh, both of which 
are countries where microfinance institutions have taken a strong stance in targeting women 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). In Brazil, child health was seen to rise more as a result of 
additional non-labor income is in hands of women than of men, and when measured with respect to 
survival probabilities, additional income in the hands of a mother was estimated to have a twenty 
times bigger impact than in the hands of a father. (Thomas, 1990)  
While the abovementioned evidence relates mostly to the household level, women are also believed 
to have a larger impact on the level of society. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) find that women as 
policy makers tend to be more biased towards provision of public goods to help families and 
communities than men. The evidence has also led to a wider, general awareness of the role of 
women in national development. For example, UNIFEM (2010) claims that without the recognition 
of women in aid delivery, developmental aid is left relatively more ineffective.  
A second line of arguments in the social and developmental agenda is based on the promotion of 
gender equality. Going back to the bargaining model of intra-household decision-making, it is 
argued that the situation can be improved by changing the economic status of women in the 
household. According to the investment theory of household resource allocation, men are favored 
over women because of their higher earning potential. Although plenty of evidence exists to support 
this theory, the model says little about the actual bargaining, which makes for the intra-household 
decision-making processes.  
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Based on models describing household choices, economists have found household decision-making 
to rely on inequalities, negotiation and conflict. For example Folbre (1984) views household 
resource allocation as an outcome of a bargaining process among household members. This would 
suggest that when adult females have higher earning capabilities, they have more bargaining power 
and are thus able to allocate more resources to female infants. Related to higher earning potential 
and power, Browning and Chiappori (1998) present a model in which bargaining power is derived 
from the women‟s ability to credibly threaten to leave the household. This can be again related back 
to the importance of financial access. With increased employment opportunities and income, 
women are more able to credibly threaten to leave the household and thus possess more bargaining 
power in the decision-making process. This is argued to change the decision-making patterns to the 
favor of women, and female children. And finally, through household level impact, improved 
financial access can be seen as to impact the overall status of women in the society. (Armendáriz 
and Morduch, 2010) 
Looking at the issue from another perspective, Behrman, Pollak and Taubman (1982) represent 
another model in which the parents intrinsically care about their children, instead of viewing them 
only as an investment opportunity as is by Becker (1981). In the Behrman, Pollak and Taubman 
(1982) model of utility maximization, both preferences and market opportunities impact the 
resource allocations. The model has been used to identify systematic gender differences in human 
capital allocation, i.e. the pro-male bias suggested by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) in rural India. 
Another similar model is the one presented by Strauss and Beegle (1996), who in addition make an 
interesting point about not all intra-household decisions being conflicting by nature. For example, 
high female child mortality rates and the better schooling of boys might be the results of joint 
decisions of resource allocation by mothers and fathers based on the better working opportunities of 
men or the more costly raising of women. The last point can be yet again used to emphasize the 
need for female access to credit. Given the improved opportunities for employment through 
entrepreneurship and self-employment, the pro-male bias in intra-household resource allocation 
would be mitigated despite the exact mechanism related to the bargaining process.  
4.2.2 Microfinance institution efficiency 
Besides the goals related to poverty reduction and gender equality, the focus on female clients is 
made more attractive to microfinance institutions by the reported repayment rates by women. In 
here, the women‟s limited access to credit often works in the lender‟s advantage. The credit 
constraints of women relative to men will make them more likely to select themselves into the 
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microcredit programs with different kinds of strings attached, ranging from weekly meetings to 
joint responsibility. This enhances dynamic incentives and reduces both ex-ante and ex-post moral 
hazard. (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010) 
The better female repayment rates have inspired a number of studies. For example, the average loan 
recovery rate for Grameen bank female borrowers is currently around 97.2% (Grameen Bank, 
2010). Meanwhile, research has shown that 15.3% of Grameen Bank male borrowers face 
difficulties in loan repayments, while only 1.3% female borrowers struggle with paying back their 
loans (Khandker et al., 1995).  However, in this case it should be pointed out that the low ratio of 
male clients, 3% as reported by Grameen Bank in October 2010, may influence the share of male 
borrowers with difficulties in a negative way. This happens through a selection bias:  men who are 
considered to be too risky as borrowers by formal financial institutions might be more likely to 
apply for credit from a semi-formal institution.  
Furthermore, in Guatemala, women were found to misuse their funds less often than men (Kevane, 
2001), and a similar pattern could be seen in Southern Mexico (Armendáriz and Roome, 2008). 
These results are also supported by various studies. Using a sample of 1,140,000 contracts from a 
Maghrebian microfinance institution over ten years, Marrez and Schmit (2009) find that the loss 
rates are higher for the male population than the female population. They also show that the 
difference is due to the lower probability of female clients to default, while the repayment rates of 
the two genders are equal. This can be related back to the Grameen bank observations.  
Finally, Emran et al. (2007) find that due to their more limited mobility, women are easier to 
monitor. Women tend to often work near home or at home, which significantly reduces the costs of 
monitoring them compared to men. Lower mobility also reduces the incidence of strategic default, 
as women are more fearful about social sanctions. A related point is the female risk aversion, which 
argued to lead to smaller capital gains (Roodman and Morduch, 2009).  This will be discussed in 
more detail the next section related to the criticism the gender bias in microfinance has received.  
4.2.3 Criticism of the gender bias in microfinance 
The profitability of lending to women as well as the bigger impacts in terms of poverty reduction 
and gender equality have been questioned by a new wave of research. Recent empirical evidence 
indicates significantly higher returns to investment for male-owned enterprise and points out that 
the positive repayment effect resulting from a conscious gender bias might be offset by other 
associated factors, such as the higher costs related to the smaller loans (D‟Espallier, Guérin and 
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Mersland, 2009). Moreover, the latest research poses a question about the true impacts of a gender 
bias on intra-household relations, pointing out that focusing on women is also related to negative 
outcomes (Mayoux, 2006). In fact, the researchers today already talk of “second generation” of 
microfinance (Karlan and Zinman, 2009). For the new generation of microfinance institutions the 
focus on women is inefficient as well as unprofitable. To avoid problems and enhance efficiency, 
they prefer mixed groups in lending, basing their position on a variety of arguments. 
To begin, Roodman and Morduch (2009) question the causal link in Khandker‟s (2005) theory of 
borrowing to women increasing the household welfare more than borrowing to men, pointing out 
that females tend to yield lower returns on investment than men. De Mel et al. (2009) show similar 
results for female run microenterprise in Sri Lanka, and moreover, Karlan and   Zinman (2009) 
demonstrate the same phenomenon in the Philippines.  
Furthermore, although meaning well, some argue that microcredit may have even negative 
consequences for women (Mayoux, 2006). It has been shown to increase intra-household conflicts, 
inequality and even violence against women (UNESCAP, 2007). Threatened by the changes in 
intra-household dynamics, men might react aggressively to microfinance schemes. The literature 
review for the Office of Development Effectiveness and Gender Based Violence Evaluation 
(AusAID, 2008) picks up on this point: “although micro-credit strengthens women‟s ability to stand 
up to family violence, in some cases it has increased violence against women and family break-
ups”. Other possible negative gender impacts relate to the spending of funds after women have been 
granted them. Goetz and Gupta (1996) find that of 40% of women, who had been given microcredit, 
lacked control over their loans in the end of the day. If the intra-household decision-making doesn‟t 
radically change, the expenditure decisions might also continue to prioritize men and male children. 
This would reinforce the negative gender bias. Furthermore, the responsibility of women to repay 
loans may absolve men of responsibility for the household, decreasing the overall level of 
household welfare. (AusAID, 2008) 
Adopting another perspective, Mumtaz (2000) blames the microfinance institutions of taking 
advantage of the women‟s lower status in the household. To give loans to women because recovery 
is easier equals exploiting the structural disadvantage that confines women to their homes. Rather 
than taking advantage of women‟s condition, one should look for ways to overcome these obstacles. 
If women‟s development is the goal, recovery cannot be prioritized at the cost of continuing the 
subordination of the “target group”. (Mumtaz, 2000)  
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Finally, Bauchet and Morduch (2010) find a negative correlation between operational self-
sufficiency, profitability and percentage of female clients served. Due to the conflicting relationship 
between commercial transformation of the MFI, and focus on women, the percentage of female 
clients fallen for certain institutions (Frank, 2008). This is widely referred to as the mission drift, 
which is one of the most discussed topics in the field of microfinance today. At the present, 85% of 
non-governmental organizations cater women, while only 66% of MFI target female clients (Cull et 
al., 2009). Whether the direction is right or wrong, is subject to intense debate, but despite criticism, 
gender focus seems to hold as the dominant strategy of microfinance institutions. The social and 
developmental arguments, higher repayment rates, and the increasing interest in women from the 
donor and investor side, still cause many microfinance institutions to seek “the double bottom line”, 
yielding both financial and social returns. 
4.3 Female tendency to communal informal finance 
Due to the self-determined character of informal financial institutions, it is somewhat more difficult 
to determine role of women in informal financial arrangements such as ROSCAS. Unregulated and 
unsupervised, their size may vary from a handful of individuals to several hundred people, and their 
members may be all women, all men, or a mixture of both (Baydas et. al,1993). However, due to the 
reasons of more limited female access to finance discussed in section 4.1, it is often assumed that 
women have a higher demand for informal forms of finance than men (Armendáriz and Morduch, 
2010).  
Empirical evidence seems to support this. Anderson and Baland (2002) find an overwhelming 84 
percent of the ROSCA participants in the slums of Nairobi to be women. Their detailed evidence 
thus suggests most ROSCAs are predominantly composed of women, particularly those living in a 
couple and earning an independent income. This relates to the household decision-making processes 
discussed earlier, as well as to the demand for ROSCAS in terms of saving purposes. Mayoux and 
Anand (1995), among others, argue that ROSCAs “play an important role in increasing women‟s 
control over resources which they can use to increase assets in the family”.  
However, the tendency of women to participate in communal forms of informal finance is not only 
limited to poor women, who have no other financial alternatives or ways of keeping the money out 
of the reach of their male relatives or husbands. Examining forms of informal financial sector in 
Egypt, Baydas et al. find a “bazaar of informal financial arrangements” among women, even in the 
presence and access to formal banking services. This supports the social and cultural rationale 
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behind female tendency to form informal financial groups as discussed by for example Anderson 
and Baland (2002). 
Somewhat contrarian evidence is provided by findings by researchers such as Thomas (1989), who 
find that while women may have a higher tendency to form ROSCAs of a relatively small size, men 
are more likely to participate in high-budget rotating-credit-associations. Nevertheless, the majority 
of evidence from ROSCAs in sub-Saharan Africa seems to point at the direction of a higher female 
participation in communal forms of informal finance. 
5. Basis for the empirical analysis 
5.1 Introduction to Uganda 
Uganda is an interesting case country for an empirical study, as it has a relatively diverse financial 
sector considering its low level of overall development (Heikkilä, Kalmi and Ruuskanen, 2009). 
Within its almost 241,000 km
2
 and a population of 32.3 billion, Unganda embraces various different 
regions with different levels of economic and social development, political systems, ethnic groups, 
religions and cultures (CIA Fact Book, 2010).  
5.1.1 Economic and political situation 
After several decades of civil war and economic mismanagement, Uganda began to rehabilitate its 
economic infrastructure and restore macroeconomic stability in 1987. Since 1987 the Ugandan 
economy experienced varying growth rates, with an average GDP growth rate of 7.2% between 
1997-2001, 6.8% between 2001-2004, and 8% over the period 2004-2008. (Ingvés and Bio-Tchané, 
2003) The estimated average growth rate for the period of 2009-2015 is approximately 6.6% (IMF, 
2010). The global economic crisis hurt Uganda‟s exports, but its growth rate is still relatively 
strong, thanks to the country‟s relatively successful dealing with the crisis. For example, the 
estimated industrial production growth rate was 5.3% in 2009, making Uganda number 24 in 
country comparison to the world (CIA World Fact Book, 2010). At the current GDP growth rate, 
the nominal per capita income is projected to increase from USD 506 in 2008-2009 to about USD 
850 by 2014-2015. During the same period, the proportion of people living below the poverty line 
is expected to decline from the level of 31% in 2005-2006 to about 24.5% in 2014-2015 – below the 
Millenium Development Goal target of 28% (MFU, 2010).   
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Figure 3 Gross domestic product per capita, current prices 
Despite the progress, compared to other economies in Africa and Asia, the size of the economy and 
the per capita income in Uganda are low. While Uganda‟s economic performance was at par with 
that of countries such as Kenya and Ghana even in the early 21
st
 century, these economies have 
since improved significantly over Uganda‟s economy. (MFU, 2010) Although Uganda‟s dealing 
with the economic crisis could be considered successful, there remains much to be done in order to 
strengthen and support the fundamentals of economic development in the country.  
One of the problems lies in agricultural inefficiency (Benin et al, 2008). The GDP growth has been 
accompanied with changes in the sectoral composition, reflecting a structural transformation in the 
economy. Particularly, the share of agriculture has fallen from approximately 34% 2001 to 23% in 
2009. However, while the share of agriculture in the GDP has fallen, the share of labor force 
engaged in agriculture has increased from 75% in 2006 to approximately 82% in 2009 (MFU, 2010; 
CIA Wrold Factbook, 2010). These trends stem from the low productivity in agriculture, 
undermining growth potential of the total economy and contributing to issues related to food 
insecurity (Benin et al, 2008). Still largely dependent on agriculture and characterized by primary 
production for exports, Uganda is left vulnerable to external shocks, especially to falling 
commodity prices. (MFU, 2010) This could be seen as to highlight the importance of 
entrepreneurship in terms of creating non-agricultural employment.  
When it comes to the labor situation, 86% of the population in Uganda is self-employed and close 
to 1.5 million people, that is, nearly 90% of the non-farming population is employed in micro- and 
small enterprise. (MFU, 2010) This means a significant market potential for microfinance 
institutions, which are in fact recognized in the governmental economic planning (Ingvés and Bio-
Tchané, 2003). The governmental economic recognition could be seen as an important positive 
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sign, as self-employment has been generally lacking official support in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Blackden and Sudharshan, 2003).  
5.1.2 Financial system in Uganda 
The financial system in Uganda can be considered to consist of the formal, semi-formal and 
informal sectors already discussed in this study. However, even though the financial system can be 
considered relatively developed (Heikkilä et al., 2009), there remains room for improvement. The 
Steadman Group‟s (2009) estimates 42% of the population still relies merely on informal financial 
sources, and in fact, the indicators of financial depth in Uganda are low both on absolute terms and 
in comparison to neighboring Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe. (MFU, 2010) For example, the bank 
branch penetration as quoted by the World Bank in 2008 for Uganda was notably low, with 0.53 
branches per 100,000 people, compared to 1.38 in Kenya and 3.27 in Zimbabwe (The World Bank, 
2008). However, already in 2010 the Steadman Group finds formal financial access for adults to be 
21%, while 7% are reported to have access through semiformal institutions. In fact, since 2006, the 
Ugandan financial sector has developed considerably and at a relatively fast pace.  
Most notably, the number of commercial banks has grown from 15 in 2006 to 22 in 2009, while the 
number of commercial bank branches grew from 301 to 363 in just one year from 2008 to 2009. 
The outreach has been also improved through the introduction of mobile money services, and there 
has been a series of mergers and buy-offs of microfinance and deposit institutions, as well as 
commercial banks. Some micro deposit institutions have been also upgraded to commercial banks. 
Finally, there has been increased implementation of Village Saving and Loan Associations and 
Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) both by non-governmental organizations and the 
central government, emphasizing the growing importance of the semiformal financial sector. 
(Steadman Group, 2010) In fact, the three major government policy documents that drive the 
national economic agenda (Poverty Eradication and Action Plan, the Program for the Modernization 
of Agriculture and the Medium-Term Competitiveness Strategy) all include microfinance as an 
element of development (UMFPED, 2002). 
While improving financial access through microfinance is considered one of the pillars contributing 
to poverty reduction, in their participatory poverty assessment report (2002) the Ugandan Ministry 
of Financial Planning and Economic Development (UMFPED, 2002) also found out that there exist 
hardships with available microfinance in Uganda: 
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“Women in Nakaloke noted that their poverty is a result of stringent conditions in the 
available microfinance institutions that prevent them from accessing loans. Women in 
Nakaloke mentioned that they were aware of micro-finance institutions in Mbale, but these 
loans were not accessible because of collateral and other attendant processes. The other 
processes that made loans unpopular included; the time for repayment of loans, the small 
size of most loans and the fact that investment areas were also not very many in their 
community. The married women in particular fear accessing loans to start small businesses 
as their husbands always grab such funds from them.”  
While semi-formal institutions traditionally overcome the question of collateral through 
mechanisms of group lending and dynamic incentives, the above quote reflects many other 
problems generally associated with microfinance. The repayment schedules are often tight, and the 
loans by definition small. On the other hand, 67% of those holding a loan in Uganda, say they 
borrow money to meet daily needs (Steadman Group, 2010). While this could be seen as to question 
the need for large loans, it is still consistent with the problem of few investment opportunities. 
Finally, the last quote refers to loans ending up at husbands‟ control despite having been given to 
women, which is a common finding in many microfinance studies, reflecting the problems related 
to intra-household resource allocation and gender equality (Mayoux, 2006).  
5.1.3 Financial access of women in Uganda  
When it comes to differences in usage of financial services by gender, the Steadman Group (2010) 
finds more men (24%) than women (18%) to use formal financial institutions. On the other hand, 
they note that a slightly higher proportion of women (8%) than men (7%) use semiformal financial 
services, and also that more women (43%) than men (41%) use informal financial services. This is 
consistent with general findings of differences between formal, semiformal and informal institutions 
provision of financial services to women. However, the group finds no difference in overall 
borrowing by women and men, even though they do note that use of formal financial institutions for 
credit is slightly higher among male (5%) than women (4%) and among urban (6%) than rural (4%) 
borrowers. (Steadman Group, 2010)  
Largely thanks to the battle of the women‟s movements over land rights, Wryod (2008), among 
others, argues that a new configuration of gender relations is evident in urban Uganda: one that 
accommodates some aspects of women‟s rights while retaining previous notions of innate male 
authority. This could be assumed to have an impact on female financial access, especially assuming 
that the share of women in possession of collateral would increase. Higher ownership of land could 
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also result in potential differences in provision of financial services to women in urban and rural 
areas, as the Steadman Group (2010) reports landownership is generally less common in urban than 
rural areas. However, one should also remember that borrowing from formal sources per se is more 
common in urban than rural areas, which leaves the final impact uncertain.  
When it comes to the second economic constraint of women, their access to labor markets, it is 
noted that women in Uganda work from 2 to 10 hours longer days than men, even though their 
economic compensation is less (Blackden and Sudharshan, 2003). Using data from Ghana and 
Uganda, Canagarajah et al. (2001) show that women‟s labor force participation in Uganda increased 
substantially within a period of 5-6 years in the 1990‟s. Based on a household level analysis, they 
point out that non-farm employment is growing, providing many women income and employment. 
This again places emphasis on female entrepreneurship. Most importantly, Canagarajah et al. 
(2001) note that the increased female employment has led to decreasing poverty rates and increased 
wellbeing – supporting the social and developmental agenda of the MFI.  
5.2 Data description 
The data used for this study was collected as a part of a FinScope survey 2009, addressing questions 
of demand, access and usage of financial services in Uganda. The study was a follow-up to one 
conducted in 2006, while similar studies were also carried out in other African countries, namely in 
Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Nigeria. An advisory committee was gathered to formulate the 
questionnaire and oversee project implementation, consisting of representatives from various 
institutions, including the Bank of Uganda. The fieldwork was conducted by Synovate, and data 
processing and report writing by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Finmark Trust and Uganda 
Insurances Association.  (Steadman Group, 2010) 
The study employed face-to-face data collection. A structured questionnaire was used to interview 
randomly selected respondents of age 16 and above. The field team was trained, and the final 
version of the questionnaire was translated into seven local languages. The main data collection 
took place approximately during the two months between November 2009 and January 2010. The 
major obstacles encountered during collection included the absence of respondents, and refusals to 
participate. The sample size totaled 3001 respondents, and was distributed between all 56 districts 
in Uganda, enabling the survey to capture a wide spectrum of demographics and valuable 
information of the developmental status in different regions. (Steadman Group, 2010) 
39 
 
5.3 Hypotheses setting 
As discussed in the previous chapters, as a result of socio-economic reasons, women are considered 
to be more excluded from the provision of formal credit in developing countries than men. On the 
other hand, the semiformal banking sector, including NGOs and microfinance institutions, has 
traditionally explicitly targeted women. Finally, the informal financial sector, defined as communal 
forms of finance, receives a higher participation by women.  Based on these notions, and the 
analysis of the previous chapters, the following hypotheses were constructed: 
Hypothesis 1. It is significantly harder for women to receive credit from formal financial 
institutions than for men.  
Hypothesis 2. It is significantly easier for women to receive credit from semi-formal financial 
institutions than for men.   
Hypothesis 3. It is significantly easier for women to receive credit from informal institutions than 
for men. 
6. Empirical model 
6.1 Variable definitions 
The dependent variable of the study was identified as the lending institution, and constructed to 
include all three categories of financial institutions in developing countries. The independent 
variables used for the study were determined based on the analysis of the previous chapters, and 
also included control variables for demographic and regional factors.    
6.1.1 Dependent variable 
Lending institution (formal, semi-formal, informal) 
Before constructing the dependent variable, the specific financial institutions identified in the 
questionnaire were divided into formal, semiformal and informal institutions. The categorization 
followed the one by the National Bureau of Statistics Uganda, including the definition of informal 
financial institutions in accordance to the communal forms of informal finance. The following table 
demonstrates the final division:  
 
40 
 
(1) Formal financial institutions (2) Semiformal financial institutions (3) Informal financial institutions 
Commercial banks 
Credit institutions 
Micro deposit institutions 
SACCOS 
NGOs 
Other MFI, which are not SACCOS 
VSLA 
Savings Clubs 
ROSCAs 
Welfare Funds 
Investment Clubs 
Burial societies 
Others 
Table 2 Categorization of the financial institutions 
The dependent variable itself is an indicator variable based two questions. First, the respondent 
must answer positively to the question “which of the following do you currently have from a 
financial institution, group, organization or place: personal loan, credit card, overdraft, a mortgage 
or lease, or hire purchase?”. Upon a positive answer, the second question follows: “what is the 
source of the most recent current loan or credit?”, dividing the indicator variable further into three 
categories for loans from (1) formal, (2) semiformal and (3) informal sources. The base category (4) 
is defined as individuals, who are currently not borrowing from any institution, but have expressed 
a need for credit by borrowing from non-institutional sources such as friends, relatives or for 
example shops. Thus we end up with the dependent variable lending institution, obtaining values 
from one to four. 
With the abovementioned restrictions, the final sample size totaled 1155 respondents, of whom 
3.8% were currently borrowing from a formal financial institution, 1.6% from a semiformal 
financial institution and 3.7% from an informal financial institution. The observations are mutually 
exclusive – a person borrowing from a formal institution was not counted as borrowing from semi-
formal or informal sources, even though he had expressed so.  
6.1.2 Explanatory and control variables 
Respondent’s gender 
The gender dummy female is the primary explanatory variable of the study, and takes value one if 
the respondent is female, zero if male. The sample of 1155 respondents consisted of 56% female 
and 44% male respondents. This is in accordance with the Steadman Group (2009) estimation, but 
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somewhat differs from the national estimate for sex ratio in Uganda; 52% female versus 48% male 
(CIA World Factbook, 2010).  
Setting (urban, rural) 
The control variable for setting, urban, takes value one for respondents living in urban and zero for 
respondents living in rural households. Its purpose is to control for the vast differences in rural and 
urban areas in terms of socio-economic development, employment, infrastructure, and thus, access 
to credit. 57% of the houses were within 5km of formal financial institutions, while 86% were 5km 
from informal financial institutions.  
Region (North, East, West, Central excluding Kampala, Kampala) 
The control variable for region is to account for regional differences in provision of credit. These 
dummy variables take value one when the respondent resides in the corresponding region, and zero 
otherwise. In the analysis, residents of East, West, Central region excluding Kampala and Kampala 
are compared to those living in the North. For the purposes of this study, Kampala is viewed as a 
separate entity from the Central region so as to control for the effects related to urban 
circumstances. In addition to administrative sectors and overall level of development, the variables 
help to control for the 11 major ethnic groups in Uganda, which show significant regional variance 
(CIA World Factbook, 2010). 
Respondent’s age and age squared 
Age and age squared are continuous control variables for the respondent‟s age. The age structure in 
Uganda is as in most of the developing world, biased to the young. The median age in Uganda is 15 
years for the total population, 14.9 years for males and 15.1 for females. The average life 
expectancy in Uganda as quoted by national sources, is 52.7 years for the total population, 51.7 
years for males and 53.8 years for females (CIA World Factbook, 2010) The mean age of the 
sample respondents, who were all 16 or above, was 34.2 years. The age variable is assumed to 
impact provision of credit positively.  
Children 
The number of children has various effects on the economic positioning of the household. The 
impacts include increased expenditure, but also increased household income. In developing 
countries, even younger children are expected to participate in the income generation. In Uganda, as 
well as in elsewhere in the developing world, the high average number of children (6.73 per 
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woman) is also related to the low level of social security and high child mortality rate (6.38%), as 
children are expected to look after their aging parents (CIA World Factbook, 2010). The average 
number of children in the sample was considerably lower than the nationally estimated average in 
Uganda, being only 3.10. 
Adults 
The number of adult members in a household may vary significantly in developing countries, as the 
household unit is often extended to include more than the immediate family. This has a major 
impact on the household earning potential, but also impacts its aggregate expenditures. The average 
number of adults in a household in the survey was 2.40.  
Marital status 
The control dummy for marital status takes the value one if the respondent is married, and zero if he 
is not. The definition of married is extended to cover monogamy, polygamy as well as cohabiting. 
The non-married include single, separated and widowed respondents. The marital status is likely to 
have a significant impact especially on women‟s access to credit, even though this impact may be 
controversial, as being married might both increase and decrease a woman‟s access. Of the sample 
respondents, 60.5% were married.  
Status in household (household head) 
The dummy variable status in the household takes the value one, if the respondent refers to him- or 
herself as the household head. It shows some correlation with gender (0.47), but was viewed as an 
essential control variable in terms of intra-household decision-making and its potential impacts on 
access to credit. 
Literacy skills 
67% of the total population in Uganda is literate, when literacy is defined as individuals aged over 
15 year, who can read and write (CIA World Factbook, 2010). Of the sample population over 16 
years old, 70% were considered literate.  Literacy skills are likely to correlate strongly with a 
person‟s access to credit, both directly in terms of understanding the procedures related to granting 
a loan and indirectly in terms of higher earning potential. Due to the relatively low level of the 
education system as a whole in Uganda, literacy was considered separate to education.  
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Level of education (primary, higher) 
The level of education of the respondent is specified by the highest level of education attained, 
divided into primary level and higher level education, higher level education being defined as 
secondary level education and above. The level of education is expected to have a positive impact 
on the respondent‟s access to credit. In Uganda, the average school life expectancy is ten years, but 
regional variations are vast and the level of the overall educational system moderate. Men are likely 
to study a year longer than women, and the women are generally more often excluded from 
education than men. (CIA World Factbook, 2010)             
Employment (not working, agriculture, wage employment, self-employment) 
The control variable for employment is specified as an answer to a question concerning the 
respondent‟s main source of income. The answers were divided into employed in the agriculture, 
wage employment and self-employment, and compared to individuals not working at the moment. 
The not working category included dependence on others, as well as pension transfers and rent, as 
these do not involve active participation in the labor market. Respondents who specified no source 
of income were dropped out. 
Not working Agriculture Wage employment Self-employment 
Pension 
Dependence on 
household member 
Dependence on relatives  
Dependence on friends 
Rent income 
Dependence on church 
Sell produce from own 
farm 
Sell product from own 
livestock 
Sell own livestock 
Fishing 
Working on other 
people‟s farms 
Working in other 
people‟s homes 
Working for an individual 
in private business 
Employed in the formal 
sector 
Running own business 
Trading in agricultural 
produce from others 
Trading in livestock 
products bought from 
others  
Trading in fish bought 
from others 
Table 3 Categorization of employment variables 
Wealth indicator 
The variable wealth indicator takes values zero to four depending on the estimated household 
wealth. Since finding out the exact household wealth in developing countries is hard, a wealth 
indicator was constructed based on the methodology used by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
(2000). The household welfare was estimated using housing and household characteristics, which 
were assigned points 1-2, according to the given attributes. One point would assign the respondents 
in the lower wealth quintile, and two points in the higher wealth quintile. In the end the points were 
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added up to give a total score, based on which the distribution the respondents was divided into five 
wealth quintiles, scoring 0-4. The lowest score in the sample was 19 and the highest score 35, while 
the wealth indicator had the mean of 2.14. The following tables demonstrate the characteristics 
considered when estimating the household welfare:  
Housing characteristics Household characteristics 
Type of housing unit 
Type of dwelling unit 
Type of roof 
Type of wall 
Type of floor 
 
Energy used for lighting & cooking 
Source of drinking water 
Means of transport 
Ownership of communication equipment 
Type of toilet used 
Ownership of clothes, beddings, shoes 
Frequency of eating meat or fish 
Average number of meals 
Usage of sugar and salt 
Frequency of eating breakfast (children below 5yrs) 
Type of breakfast eaten (children below 5yrs) 
Table 4 Composition of the wealth indicator 
Land ownership 
The dummy variable for land ownership takes value one, if the respondent has ownership of either 
freehold, mailo, leasehold or customary land, and zero, if the respondent has no ownership of land 
or was unable to specify the type of ownership. The purpose of this control variable is to control for 
the access to collateral. Contrary to the expectations, the variable showed no major correlation with 
the explanatory variable gender, even though access to land represents one of the most important 
gender inequalities in Uganda. (Tripp, 2004) 
6.1.3 Summary of variable correlations 
Summary tables of the variables and their correlations can be found in Appendices 4 and 5. When it 
comes to the correlations, the analysis showed no significant correlations of concern, and thus there 
was no reason to assume multicollinearity. Most notably, Kampala was correlated with the urban 
variable by 0.56 on 0.1% significance level, as could be expected. Also, higher-level education and 
literacy were found to be correlated by 0.45 and being a household head and respondent‟s age by 
0.39, both on a 0.1% significance level. In addition, the primary explanatory variable, female was 
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Lending institution 
negatively correlated with being a household head by 0.45, on a 0.1% significance level. The 
female variable was slightly negatively correlated with both agricultural and wage employment, as 
well as the wealth indicator and land ownership. Correlation with gender and self-employment was 
positive, but insignificant. Being a female was also significantly negatively correlated with higher 
education and literacy.  
6.2 Model specification 
A multinomial logistic regression was used to estimate the impact of gender on the provision of 
credit from formal, semiformal and informal institutions. The model suits the purpose well as it 
allows the extension of logit models to cover polytomous nominal responses. That is, it can be used 
to predict the probabilities of different possible outcomes of a categorically distributed dependent 
variable (lending institution), given a set of independent variables (respondent‟s gender and control 
variables). The multinomial logit model was used rather than ordered logit regression, since the 
dependent variable is not ordinal in nature. The dependent variable yi, lending institution, will take 
the following values:  
1 if the respondent currently has a loan from a formal financial 
institution 
2 if the respondent currently has a loan from a semi-formal financial 
institution 
3 if the respondent currently has a loan from an informal financial 
institution 
4 if the respondent currently has no loan from any financial 
institution, but has expressed a need for credit by currently borrowing 
from friends, family members, employer or money lenders, or has 
current debt outstanding for buying goods or services on credit 
Each response for row i,    (             )
 , is assumed to have a multinomial distribution with 
index     ∑    
 
    and parameter    (             )
  , in which n is the total number of trials 
for row i, and yij is the number in which j occurred, that is when a person currently holds a loan in a 
formal, semi-formal or informal financial institution. The subindex r denotes the number of 
categories in the dependent variable, that is r=4. Taking j
*     as the baseline category, the 
multinomial logit model will take the form: 
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in which xi represents the independent variables, β is the multinomial logit regression coefficient, 
and     (
   
    
) tells the log-odds of the response row taking the value yij  as opposed to yij*. This is 
demonstrated by the coefficients   : 
    [            ]  or      ( )  _
  
  
 
    
 . 
The k
th
 element of βj can be interpreted as the increase in log-odds of falling into category j, that is 
having a loan from a formal, semi-formal or informal financial institution, versus the base-category 
j
*
, that is not having loan at all, resulting from a one-unit increase in the k
th
 covariate, holding the 
other covariates constant. 
As for the baseline category j
*
, category (4) was created for this purpose, including individuals, who 
are currently not borrowing from any financial institution, but have expressed a need for credit in 
terms of their outstanding debts to neighbors, relatives, shops or equivalent. This restriction on the 
base category was made in order to isolate the population with demand for credit, and to achieve 
better correspondence with the theoretical framework. The restriction induces a problem of a 
limited sample size, but is necessary in order preserve the theoretical relevance of the model. From 
the multinomial logit model point of view, category (4) makes the most natural category for 
comparison as, despite the limited sample size it is still the category with the most observations.    
To get the impact of gender and the other independent variables on the increase in the probability of 
the respondent having a loan from a given type of financial institution versus not having loan, but 
having expressed need for a loan, we need to calculate πi from β. The back-transformation for the 
non-baseline categories is:  
     
    (  
   )
   ∑    (  
   )    
 . 
For the base line category the back-transformation is: 
         
 
   ∑    (  
   )    
 . 
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The multinomial logit model thus provides answers to the question of the impact of gender on the 
odds of a respondent having a loan from a given financial institution, compared to the odds of the 
respondent not having a loan from any institution, but having expressed the need for one through 
non-institutional borrowing. (Agresti, 2003)  
7. Empirical results 
Prior to running the final results, the sample was adjusted to be representative of the population, as 
in the original data there was a bias towards the urban population relative to the actual ratio of urban 
and rural inhabitants in Uganda. The results of the empirical study were estimated by a method 
based on baseline probabilities. First baseline probabilities for each category of the dependent 
variable were calculated keeping all dummy variables at zero and assigning continuous variables to 
their means. These probabilities were then compared to the probabilities of each category, when one 
independent variable at a time was changed from zero to one, or in the case of continuous variables, 
increased by one unit.  
It is acknowledged that these baseline probabilities are arbitrary, and that for accurate results one 
should estimate the marginal changes for each individual case. However, considering the nature and 
scope of the study, the above described method was considered more appropriate and sufficient. At 
this point it is noted that the limited sample size and low rates of overall institutional borrowing was 
likely to affect the results of the empirical analysis. A summary table of the results can be found in 
Appendix 6.  
7.1 Female access to credit 
When it comes to the primary independent variable, we find that out of the three categories of the 
dependent variable under inspection, gender was a significant explanatory variable only in the semi-
formal category on a 5% significance level. Thus we accept the Hypothesis 2; “it is significantly 
easier for women to receive credit from semiformal financial institutions than for men”. By 
changing the dummy variable female from zero to one, the probability of a person currently holding 
a loan from a semiformal institution increased 3.6-fold. However, as the baseline probability per se 
for this category is low, the change in percentage units was not major; from 0.23 percent to 0.83 
percent.  
In the case of formal financial institutions, increasing the gender dummy variable from zero to one 
resulted in a 147 percent increase in probability, but the female explanatory variable was not 
significant. Thus we reject the Hypothesis 1 of higher female exclusion from formal credit markets, 
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and accept the Null Hypothesis of no significant evidence of female exclusion. While somewhat 
contrarian to the Steadman Group (2010) finding of a slightly higher rate of male borrowing from 
formal sources, it is noted that prior research has also shown mixed results in terms of empirical 
evidence of access to formal credit. This may be due to a variety of factors, including the difficulty 
of defining and measuring financial access. In this case, the formal category of the dependent 
variable also showed the most significance in other explanatory variables besides gender.   
The insignificance of the informal category and acceptance of Null Hypothesis 3, “it is not 
significantly easier for women to receive credit from informal sources”, could be considered 
somewhat unexpected, as a higher rate of female borrowers from informal groups was assumed. 
Again, this could be due to various reasons. For one, it may be that the significance was diluted due 
to similarities between the informal category and the arbitrary baseline category, for example in 
rural setting. On the other hand, the dependent variable constructed assumed the categories to be 
mutually exclusive, while the Steadman Group (2010) finds the informal category to overlap with 
the formal and semi-formal categories by 19 percent. Lastly, as in the case of formal provision of 
credit, the prior research has also demonstrated varying results, and due to the complexity of the 
matter, it is unlikely that the model was unable to account for all possible factors influencing the 
final outcome.  
7.2 Control variables 
Of the control variables, urban variable for setting seemed to have no significant impact on the 
probability of holding credit from institutional sources. Interestingly the variable did show 
significance for formal and semi-formal sources before the sample was adjusted for the population, 
which decreased the share of the urban population relative to the rural population. The adjustment 
did not however affect the significance of regional differences. Being a resident of the Eastern 
region decreased the probability of holding credit from semi-formal and informal sources at 1% 
significance level, while residing in the Western region decreased the respective formal and 
semiformal probabilities at 1% significance level. Living in the central region also decreased the 
probability of holding credit from formal and semiformal sources, while inhabitants of Kampala had 
a lower probability of holding credit from any of the institutional sources. All comparisons were 
made with respect to the Northern region, which bears a history of conflict and instability, but has 
recently been subject to vast humanitarian aid and shown significant improvement in terms of 
overall development (Virtual Presence Post, 2011). Also, it should be pointed out that as the 
baseline probabilities were relatively small, the changes in percentage units were not large. 
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Furthermore, the regional effects in the case of Kampala can be assumed to be to some extent 
accounted for in the control variable for urban setting.  
Age was a significant explanatory variable for formal and informal credit, increasing the probability 
of having some by 113% and 110% respectively, on 5% and 10% significance levels. The results 
were estimated by increasing the control variable from the mean 34.52 to 35.52. Age did not, 
however, have significant impact semi-formal sources of credit. For the semi-formal institutions, 
their agenda for poverty reduction may explain the insignificance – microcredit may be extended 
irrespective of age. For informal groups, age could be assumed to represent a proxy for 
trustworthiness; members sharing a long history may know and trust each other better. Also, the 
likelihood of having accumulated some wealth and ability to enter an informal group can be 
assumed to grow with age. This applies also to formal sources.  
Interestingly, education was insignificant for all categories of the dependent variable, while literacy 
was only significant for formal sources of credit, where it increased the probability of holding credit 
from a formal source over four-fold at 1% significance level. This could have been expected. Those 
relying merely on informal sources are less likely to be literate, while the insignificance of the 
literacy variable may be interpreted as a sign of the semi-formal institution poverty reduction 
agenda. Both age and education can be thus seen as reflecting the institutional differences in 
provision of credit. Literacy and age were also found to be negatively correlated, indicating lower 
level of education of the older population.  
Being a household head turned out to be insignificant in terms of credit provision, while marriage 
was only significant for formal financial institutions – being married increased the probability of 
holding formal credit 2.7-fold at 1% significance level. In this case marriage may be interpreted as a 
proxy for creditworthiness, as being married may increase the incentives to pay back in time. For 
women, being married may in addition decrease religious and social constraints. The number of 
children in the family was insignificant for all institutions, while the number of adults increased the 
probability of holding credit from each category, reflecting the higher earning potential in these 
families. The impact of the adult control variable was the biggest for formal sources by 132% and 
the smallest for informal sources with 119%. Informal and formal sources were significant at 5% 
level, while semiformal institutions probability was affected at 10% significance level.  
The variables related to employment showed the greatest overall significance for provision of 
credit. This was expected. There was however variation between the institutional categories. 
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Agriculture was a significant variable for semiformal and informal sources of credit at 1% and 5% 
significance levels respectively, increasing both probabilities. The insignificance of agricultural 
employment in the formal category may reflect its association with more urban areas.  Wage 
employment had a significant positive impact on all categories at 5% significance level, and could 
be interpreted as a proxy for both earning potential and trustworthiness.  Self-employment increased 
the probability for semiformal and informal categories at 1% significance level, but showed a slight 
increase only at 10% significance level in the formal category. This could be seen as to indicate the 
importance of entrepreneurship for development at lower levels of income. Finally, increasing the 
average of the wealth indicator by one increased probabilities of formal and informal sources of 
credit at 1% significance level, but was insignificant in the case of semiformal financial institutions. 
This is aligned with the semiformal institution agenda of poverty reduction.  
8. Summary and conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to examine the institutional differences in provision of credit to 
women in developing countries. The study was based on a literature review of fundamental theories 
and current research, as well as on an empirical analysis of a case country, Uganda. The 
fundamental analysis was based on the theoretical model of rationing in credit markets by Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981), which was extended to female access to finance. Based on the literature review, 
it was concluded that women are likely to be more excluded from formal sources of credit, while 
they are often targeted by semi-formal institutions, and may have a higher tendency to form 
informal financial groups. However, it was also noted that the boundaries of institutional 
differences have begun to blur in various ways.  
Recent research questions the social and developmental agenda behind the microfinance 
institution‟s female focus, as well as its profitability. Further, formal financial institutions have 
begun to recognize the potential in the unbanked population, and it is not agreed upon that women 
are in fact more credit constrained than men. Finally, informal sources of credit have been 
suggested as an alternative for formal financial systems, and already provide a mine of lessons for 
the semiformal financial sector and microfinance institutions in particular. 
The hypotheses were nevertheless constructed based on the initial findings, indicating higher female 
access to semi-formal and informal sources of credit, and their exclusion from the formal financial 
supply. The empirical model relied on a multinomial logit regression, in which the dependent 
variable, lending institution was divided into four categories by individuals borrowing from (1) 
formal institutions, (2) semiformal institutions, (3) informal institutions and the base category (4) of 
51 
 
those, who did not have a loan from any institution, but had expressed a need for one by non-
institutional borrowing. The sample was adjusted to be representative of the population, and the 
final results were estimated using baseline probabilities.  
The analysis showed that the primary explanatory variable, female, increased the probability of an 
individual holding a loan from a semi-formal institution 3.6-fold on a 5% significance level. For the 
informal and formal categories the female variable was insignificant. Reasons for this may include 
limiting factors related to the sample size, the low overall level of borrowing in Uganda, and 
restrictions concerning the model definition and estimation of final results. The control variables 
also showed some significance. Out of these, a number could be seen as to reflect assumed 
institutional differences in provision of credit on a broader scale.  
As a conclusion, it could be stated that the study provides some evidence for institutional 
differences in provision of credit to women in developing countries. Moreover, it emphasized the 
impact of various other variables on the availability of credit, and confirmed some of the difficulties 
related to measuring financial access. These included availability of data, determination of the 
models and estimation of results, and finally, the complexity of defining financial access per se. 
This shouldn‟t however be interpreted as to undermine the importance of the theme. The field 
leaves vast room for future research, for example in terms of the wider range of variables 
influencing financial access. Further, the impact of gender on financial access is to be studied on a 
broader scale, also including other financial services besides credit. 
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Appendices  
It is hereby noted that in order to enhance coherence and continuity, all mathematical examples 
demonstrated in Appendices 1 to 3 are derived from those by Armendáriz and Morduch (2010). 
Further, in all examples, limited liability is assumed and only the borrower‟s inherent risk, not risks 
common to all, are considered. 
Appendix 1a: Adverse selection, a mathematical example 
Assume that all individuals seek to maximize their profit and each individual can borrow and invest 
1€ in a one-period project. Further assume the population of potential borrowers is heterogeneous 
and can be divided into safe and risky borrowers. A safe borrower obtains revenue y with certainty. 
A risky borrower obtains revenue y* when lucky, but zero in case of default. The probability of 
risky borrower succeeding is p, where 0<p<1. Risky borrowers do better when successful, y*>y, but 
when adjusted for risk the expected returns are equal, py*=y. 
Assume that the lending institution aims at breaking even, covering the gross cost k per unit lent. 
For every euro lent, the gross cost k>1€, since the bank needs to account for the principal as well as 
additional costs. However, k<y and k<y*, indicating that the cost of capital is smaller for even the 
low-revenue outcomes and the borrowing thus efficient in expectation for both borrowers. In the 
presence of only safe borrowers, the bank would set the interest rate at k, just breaking even. The 
revenue for borrowers would be (y-k). In the presence of both safe and risky borrowers in the 
respective proportions q and 1-q, the bank will charge a higher interest rate R so that the expected 
return from lending to an unknown borrower is equal to k: (q + (1-q)p)R = k. Solving for the new 
rate R: R = k / (q+(1-q)p). Further, we will denote the difference between R and k by A, and can 
thus write R = k + A, A = (k(1-q)(1-p)) / (q+(1-q)p). Since the bank is unable to differentiate 
between the two types of borrowers, all borrowers must pay the higher rate R.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Adverse selection example a) 
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From the above graph one can see that the lending institution breaks even charging a rate between 
k+A and y, after which the safe borrowers exit the market. At k/p the bank will again earn profit, 
and at y*/p the risky borrowers will also exit the market.  
It should be pointed out that this is a rather simple model only to demonstrate the basic mechanism 
behind adverse selection in credit markets. In reality the types of clients and the risks vary more. 
Considering a riskier case, such as lending to the poor, the bank might only break even at point k/p, 
driving the safe borrowers out of the market altogether. One can clearly see the market imperfection 
demonstrated by the following graph:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1b: Ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard, mathematical examples 
It is assumed that each individual can invest a 1€ loan in a one-period project. The returns from the 
project are y with certainty, given that the individual extends effort, or py, p<1, if the individual 
does not extend effort. The gross repayment R (principal and interest) is less than the cost of capital 
for the lending institution k. Borrower‟s return if he extends efforts is (y-R)-c, c denoting the cost of 
effort.  Borrower‟s return if he doesn‟t extend effort is p(y-R). Thus the borrower is likely to extend 
effort only if (y-R)-c > p(y-R). Solving the equation for R one gets R < y – (c/(1-p)). That is, if the 
gross interest rates rises above y – (c/(1-p)), the individual has no longer an incentive to extend 
effort. 
Assume that for the bank‟s cost of funds k it holds that y–c > k. That is, even if the borrower 
extends efforts, the net return is positive. In an ex-ante efficient situation this would happen. 
However, with limited liability, the bank has no way to force the borrower to bear the cost c. 
Further, assume that (y-c)/(1-p) < k < y-c. In order to break even, the bank must now charge R > (y-
Figure 5: Adverse selection example b) 
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c)/(1-p). This is greater than the threshold rate seen previously, and thus the borrower would shirk. 
The result in the situation is that no transaction will take place.  
At this point it is useful to consider a situation with unlimited liability and the presence of collateral. 
Let w, w<k, denote the collateral, which the bank would seize in case of default. The probability of 
default is (1-p). The borrower‟s incentive constraint is now (y-R) > p(y-R) + (1-p)(-w). 
Rearranging, R < y + w –c / (1-p). This allows a higher interest rate than without collateral. In the 
case of k < w, the bank could set an interest rate that always allows borrowing.  
This demonstrates that the problem of ex-ante moral hazard in credit markets in fact culminates in 
the lack of collateral. 
The ex-post moral hazard can be derived from the same mathematical example (Armendáriz and 
Morduch, 2010). Assume now that the 1€ project will be always successful, yielding revenue y with 
certainty. Assume also that the borrower has private wealth to be used as collateral w, and that the 
gross interest rate to the lender, R, is fixed so that the lender breaks even. The probability of the 
lender confiscating the collateral in case of default is denoted by s. If the ex-post payoff to the 
borrower is y+w-R, if he chooses to strategically default, his payoff becomes (1-s)(y+w)+sy. The 
first term refers to the case in which the default is not verified (borrower can run away with his net 
returns and collateral). The second term captures what happens if the borrower is caught (he loses 
his collateral, but is left with his net returns). Now the borrower will only choose to pay if y+w-R > 
(1-s)(y+w)+sy. His incentive constraint now becomes R < sw. Thus, a borrower without a collateral 
cannot access financing, since s*0=0.  
The absence of collateral is thus proven critical in both ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard situations.  
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Appendix 2a: Assortative matching, a mathematical example  
Let us consider an individual with a one-period project requiring a 1€ investment. The fraction of 
the population that is safe is q<1 and the fraction of the population that is risky is (1-q). A euro 
invested by a safe borrower yields y with certainty. A risky borrower obtains y*>y if successful, 
and zero otherwise. The probability of success is p<1. Assume that both have identical expected 
returns py*=y.  
In equilibrium, there will be assortative matching, since the borrowers know each other‟s types, and 
the safe borrowers will not cross-subsidize for the risky borrowers. With probability of q the bank 
faces a (safe, safe) pair of borrowers and is repaid with certainty, and with probability (1-q) a (risky, 
risky) pair. Assume that y* > 2R, so that when lucky, a risky borrower can always repay for his 
peer, but if both are unlucky (1-p)(1-p), the bank will not be paid. Let the probability of the bank 
being repaid be denoted by g.  
To calculate the equilibrium gross interest rate, we know that the chance that in a random couple 
both or at least one will repay is g = 1 – (1-p)^2.  The expected payment of the bank is thus (q+(1-
q)g)R, indicating that q percent of the population will always repay R, but (1-q) of the population 
will pay R only g percent of times. In order for the bank to break even, the cost of capital must 
equal the expected return, k = (q+(1-q)g)R. Solving for R, we get R = k / (q+(1-q)g).  
The new rate is thus smaller than the rate in the absence of group lending. This is due to the risk 
being transferred from the bank to the risky borrowers themselves through assortative matching. 
Thus, it could be said that the bank in fact price discriminates, without knowing the types of 
borrowers itself.  
Appendix 2b: Peer monitoring, mathematical examples  
Assume a borrower who pays back his loan and yields a return y with certainty. Further assume 
another borrower, who will not pay back, and yields y* with probability p and zero otherwise. 
When it comes to ex-ante moral hazard, the borrower has to decide whether to put effort into a 
project or not. Let R denote the gross interest rate and c the cost of effort. Thus the expected return 
for the borrower if he extends effort is (y-R)-c.  Members in a group are assumed to act so as to 
maximize group benefit, and anyone who deviates, suffers from social sanctions.  
In section 4.1.2 it was seen that the borrower will choose to extend efforts only if (y-R)-c>p(y-R). 
This implied an interest rate of R < y- (c/(q-p)). Any interest rate higher than this would give the 
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borrower and incentive to not extend efforts. For a two-person group the total return is (2y-2R)-2c. 
On the other hand, if both decide to shirk, they will be able to pay the joint obligation (2y-2R) only 
p^2 percent of the time. If one shirks, but one is lucky, the lucky one will have to pay for the other 
one as well, leaving no surplus. Thus the incentive constraint is (2y-2R)-2c > p^2(2y-2R). Solving 
for R, this gives R < y –c / (1-p^2).  
Since p<1, it follows that p^2<1 and that (1-p^2)>(1-p). This means that the interest rate charged 
under joint liability group lending is strictly larger than the one to be achieved without it. In this 
way it serves as a collateral.  
In order to demonstrate the mitigation of ex-post moral hazard, we now consider the situation when 
the returns have been realized. We further assume, that in the absence of peer monitoring, the 
borrower will abscond with the money.  
Let the cost of monitoring be k, at which cost a borrower can observe his peer‟s actual revenue with 
probability q. Let the social sanction to be imposed in case of intended strategic default be denoted 
as d. Thus, given the gross interest rate R, the borrower will choose to repay if y-R>y-q(d+R). 
Solving for R gives R < (q/(1-q))d.  
In the absence of peer monitoring, there was no chance of observing a peer‟s actual revenue, q=0. 
Now, in equilibrium q>0. This is due to the incentive caused by joint liability. As long as k < gy, 
monitoring will take place since the borrower doesn‟t want to assume responsibility for his peer‟s 
repayment. 
Appendix 2c: Dynamic incentives, a mathematical example 
To demonstrate the impact of the non-refinancing threat, we being by assuming two periods of 
production, and a required investment of 1€, which we assume to be financed by a loan from a 
bank. At the end of each period, the borrower can create a gross return y > 1€, before repayment of 
the debt with interest. At this stage, the borrower may choose to strategically default. In order to 
avoid this, the bank can make the second period lending contingent on the repayment of the first 
period loan.  
We will first look at the case, when the borrower chooses to default. His expected payoff will then 
be y + dvy, where d is the borrower‟s discount factor and v is his probability of obtaining 
refinancing despite having defaulted, v < 1. On the other hand, if the borrower decided to repay, his 
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payoff would be y – R + dy, where R is the principal and interest payable to the bank. In this case, v 
= 1, as the bank will refinance the second period investment with certainty.  
With a finite number of periods, the borrower will not have an incentive to repay in the end of the 
second period. So considering that he chooses to repay in period 1, his expected payoff in period 2 
is dy, and vdy, in the case he decides to default. From this we can see that the borrower will choose 
to repay in period 1 only if y + vdy ≤ y – R + dy. This incentive compatibility constraint determines 
the largest gross interest rate, R, the bank can elicit from the borrowers without inducing default, 
equal to dy(1 – v). This is maximized when the probability of refinancing for those who default is 
zero, v = 0, leaving R = dy. 
Another form of dynamic incentives relates to gradually increasing the size of the loan. To see this, 
we can go back to the previous example, now assuming the bank increases the loan between periods 
1 and 2 by a factor a. Assuming constant returns to scale, this increases the opportunity cost of 
defaulting by the same factor. By defaulting, the borrower now loses ady > dy. This means the bank 
can now achieve a maximum interest rate R’ = ady > R = dy, as the incentive compatibility 
constraint is relaxed.  
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Appendix 3: Functioning of ROSCAs, a mathematical example 
The following, is a stripped-down version of a model for ROSCAs by Besley, Coate and Loury 
(1993). They look at a group of n individuals, who wish to acquire a durable and indivisible good at 
cost B. In the ROSCA, each individual regularly contributes an equal amount to a pot, which is 
distributed the members in a predetermined order. All individuals are assumed additive preferences 
over durable and non-durable consumption, defined as: v(c) without the durable, and v(c) +   with 
the durable good, further assuming that the utility v(c) is linear v(c) = c, given that c > c, where c is 
the level of consumption, and c is the subsistence level of consumption. We then suppose all 
individuals earn y in each period of time, and live for T periods in total.  
If the individual did not join a ROSCA, he would be solving  Max(T - t)(y +  ) + tc, subject to c>c 
and the budget constraint t(y-c)>B, given that t represented the date of acquisition of durable B. The 
optimal solution for a non-ROSCA member would be to consume only the minimum in each 
period, that is c = c and save the rest, until he is able to acquire the durable good. The utility can be 
represented as  
   (   )(    ) + tc = (   
 
   
)(y +  )+ 
 
    
  
We now consider the situation, had the individual joined a ROSCA. We assume his order of 
receiving the pot is i, 1 < i < n. Before the order is determined, all members have equal probability 
of ending up with rank i. We deduct that if the individual receives the pot at (i/n)t, his lifetime 
utility will be 
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The corresponding ex-ante utility for an individual, who doesn‟t know his number yet is    
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We still assume that all members will minimize their consumption in order to speed up the process 
of purchasing the durable. As we know that t can be defined as t(y-c) = B, the maximized lifetime 
utility of a ROSCA member becomes 
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All individuals minimize consumption of non-durable goods in order to be able to collect money for 
the purchasing of the durable good. Comparing this to the utility of an individual not joining the 
ROSCA, we can see that UR > UA. Even if it assumed that the individual‟s saving pattern was not 
affected by ROSCA membership, participating in a ROSCA will give all individuals the chance to 
obtain the pot early on.  
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Appendix 4 
 
Variable definitions 
This table defines the dependent and independent variables of the multinomial logit model used for the study of institutional 
differences in credit provision in Uganda.  
  N Mean Std. Err. Min  Max 
 Lending institution 1115 3.57 0.04 1 4 
Female 1115 0.56 0.02 0 1 
Urban 1115 0.25 0.02 0 1 
Region North 1115 0.05 0.00 0 1 
Region East 1115 0.31 0.02 0 1 
Region West 1115 0.32 0.02 0 1 
Region Central excl. Kampala 1115 0.28 0.02 0 1 
Kampala 1115 0.04 0.01 0 1 
Age 1115 34.24 0.57 16 105 
Age squared 1115 1363.83 47.48 256 11025 
Household head 1115 0.44 0.02 0 1 
Married 1115 0.67 0.02 0 1 
Children 1115 3.10 0.11 0 12 
Adults  1115 3.16 0.09 1 14 
Education, primary 1115 0.54 0.02 0 1 
Education, higher 1115 0.35 0.02 0 1 
Literate 1115 0.70 0.02 0 1 
Agriculture 1115 0.50 0.02 0 1 
Wage 1115 0.17 0.02 0 1 
Selfemp 1115 0.20 0.02 0 1 
Not working 1115 0.11 0.01 0 1 
Household wealth 1115 2.27 0.03 0 4 
Land ownership 1115 0.84 0.02 0 1 
 
 
Appendix 5 
Variable 
Correlations Female Urban 
Region 
North 
Region   
East 
Region 
West 
Central, excl. 
Kampala Kampala Age Age2 
Household 
head Married Children Adults 
Education, 
primary 
Education, 
higher Literate 
Not  
working Agriculture 
Wage 
employment 
Self-  
employment 
Wealth 
indicator 
Land 
ownership 
Female 1.000                      
Urban 0.020 1.000             
 
       
  (0.269)                      
Region North -0.029 -0.053 1.000                    
  (0.109) (0.004)***                     
Region East 0.016 -0.133 -0.285 1.000                   
  (0.379) (0.000)*** (0.000)***                    
Region West 0.002 -0.119 -0.289 -0.316 1.000                  
  (0.934) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***                   
Central, excl. Kampala -0.005 -0.109 -0.261 -0.285 -0.289 1.000                 
  (0.802) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***                  
Kampala 0.020 0.562 -0.176 -0.192 -0.195 -0.176 1.000                
  (0.270) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***                 
Age -0.021 -0.151 0.023 0.011 0.018 0.024 -0.102 1.000               
  (0.249) (0.000)*** (0.203) (0.563) (0.324) (0.190) (0.000)***                
Age2 -0.016 -0.150 0.021 0.016 0.024 0.016 -0.104 0.976 1.000              
  (0.372) (0.000)*** (0.242) (0.388) (0.187) (0.382) (0.000)*** (0.000)***               
Household head -0.457 -0.011 -0.023 -0.051 -0.020 0.070 0.037 0.389 0.330 1.000             
  (0.000)*** (0.550) (0.217) (0.005)*** (0.275) (0.000)*** (0.045)** (0.000)*** (0.000)***              
Married -0.011 -0.103 0.038 0.058 0.056 -0.080 -0.104 0.061 0.005 -0.101 1.000            
  (0.566) (0.000)*** (0.037)** (0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.778) (0.000)***             
Children 0.075 -0.231 0.078 0.140 0.009 -0.078 -0.205 0.002 -0.033 -0.191 0.222 1.000           
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.639) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.912) (0.075)* (0.000)*** (0.000)***            
Adults -0.015 -0.045 0.062 0.031 0.084 -0.129 -0.071 -0.080 -0.050 -0.395 0.049 0.263 1.000          
  (0.409) (0.013)** (0.001)*** (0.095)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.000)***           
Education, primary 0.002 -0.214 0.007 0.048 0.033 0.035 -0.167 -0.012 -0.023 -0.009 0.113 0.081 -0.037 1.000         
  (0.896) (0.000)*** (0.720) (0.008)*** (0.070)* (0.059)* (0.000)*** (0.524) (0.206) (0.609) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.045)**          
Education, higher -0.104 0.334 -0.117 -0.036 -0.074 0.034 0.262 -0.224 -0.213 -0.029 -0.110 -0.121 0.090 -0.717 1.000        
  (0.000) *** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.047)** (0.000)*** (0.062)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.108) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***         
Literate -0.136 0.204 -0.175 -0.115 0.042 0.133 0.155 -0.257 -0.249 -0.027 -0.030 -0.066 0.079 -0.027 0.453 1.000       
  (0.000) *** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.021)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.147) (0.099)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.135) (0.000)***        
Not working 0.164 0.183 -0.026 -0.001 -0.093 0.003 0.161 -0.078 -0.017 -0.221 -0.112 -0.049 0.104 -0.093 0.141 0.049 1.000      
  (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.151) (0.963) (0.000)*** (0.868) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.360) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.007)***       
Agriculture -0.037 -0.414 0.011 -0.007 0.199 0.014 -0.300 0.169 0.148 0.040 0.136 0.157 0.044 0.188 -0.261 -0.117 -0.380 1.000     
  (0.041) (0.000) *** (0.556) (0.713) (0.000)*** (0.436) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.030)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.015)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***      
Wage employment -0.126 0.179 -0.025 0.027 -0.042 -0.041 0.108 -0.090 -0.100 0.079 -0.056 -0.117 -0.084 -0.109 0.163 0.076 -0.200 -0.428 1.000    
  (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.168) (0.147) (0.023) (0.026)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***     
Self employment 0.016 0.176 0.030 -0.017 -0.124 0.019 0.132 -0.048 -0.070 0.082 -0.017 -0.033 -0.068 -0.045 0.045 0.034 -0.215 -0.461 -0.242 1.000   
  (0.376) (0.000) *** (0.102) (0.366) (0.000)*** (0.302) (0.000)*** (0.008)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.359) (0.075)* (0.000)*** (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.060)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***    
Wealth indicator -0.030 0.202 -0.196 -0.008 0.013 0.059 0.172 -0.152 -0.157 -0.087 0.066 -0.030 0.119 -0.096 0.308 0.299 0.092 -0.089 -0.004 0.033 1.000  
  (0.097) (0.000) *** (0.000)*** (0.675) (0.464) (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.098)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.827) (0.073)*   
Land ownership  -0.044 -0.394 0.171 -0.011 0.133 -0.059 -0.316 0.148 0.146 -0.027 0.106 0.207 0.122 0.122 -0.198 -0.122 -0.107 0.299 -0.132 -0.154 -0.076 1.000 
  (0.015) (0.000) *** (0.000)*** (0.531) (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.143) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  
This table represents the independent variable correlation coefficients. The 
standard errors are represented in parenthesis and the significance levels as 
follows: (*) at 10%, (**) at 5% and (***) at 1% significance level.  
  
Appendix 6 
Results of the multinomial logit regression  
This table presents the results of the multinomial logit regression for the estimation of the impact of gender on provision of credit from (1) formal, (2) semi-
formal and (3) informal financial institutions in Uganda. Dependent variables (1), (2) and (3) take value yi = 1, when the respondent currently holds a loan from 
each given institution. The base category (4) is defined as the individuals, who have expressed a need for credit by non-institutional borrowing, but do not 
currently have a loan from any institution. Standard errors are indicated in the parenthesis, and the significance levels are as follows: (*) = 10% significance 
level, (**)=5% significance level and (**)=1% significance level. The baseline probabilities for each category is calculated keeping all dummy variables at zero 
and continuous variables at their sample means. (N = 1115) 
  1 2 3 
Female 0.5529 1.3190 0.4220 
  (0.3767) (0.5539)** (0.3745) 
Urban 0.2101 0.8509 -0.2272 
  (0.3966) (0.5929) (0.4363) 
Region East -0.6390 -1.7724 -1.8915 
  (0.5641) (0.5572)*** (0.4578)*** 
Region West -1.5218 -2.7550 -0.6530 
  (0.5612)*** (0.6318)*** (0.3995) 
Region Central excluding Kampala -1.6479 -2.8478 -3.5631 
  (0.5907)*** (0.6888)*** (0.7509)*** 
Kampala -2.4908 -3.2931 -2.5108 
  (0.7322)*** (0.8861)*** (1.0523)** 
Age 0.1288 0.0243 0.1003 
  (0.0590)** (0.0764) (0.0521)* 
Age squared -0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0009 
  (0.0006)* (0.0009) (0.0006) 
Head of household 0.9899 -0.2979 0.0226 
  (0.4356) (0.5399) (0.4299) 
Married 1.0615 0.7359 0.1200 
  (0.3713)*** (0.4796) (0.3563) 
Children -0.1054 0.0085 -0.0131 
  (0.0781) (0.0736) (0.0677) 
Adults  0.2869 0.2351 0.1904 
  (0.1148)** (0.1299)* (0.0933)** 
Education, primary -0.8499 0.7257 -0.4137 
  (0.7012) (0.8785) (0.4342) 
Education, higher -0.3387 0.7247 -0.7738 
  (0.7560) (0.9992) (0.5452) 
Literate 1.5023 0.4329 -0.0192 
  (0.3903)*** (0.5567) (0.3486) 
Agriculture 0.1409 2.4799 2.4552 
  (0.5996) (0.8248)*** (0.9951)** 
Wage 1.1915 2.3550 2.6020 
  (0.5675)** (0.9384)** (1.0483)** 
Selfemployment 1.1336 3.0162 2.6816 
  (0.5982)* (0.8771)*** (1.0354)*** 
Household wealth 0.6887 0.2639 0.7900 
  (0.1973)*** (0.3380) (0.2399)*** 
Land ownership -0.6312 -0.0778 0.1905 
  (0.4175) (0.5342) (0.4779) 
Baseline probability 0.0205 0.0023 0.0317 
